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The purpose of this document is to identify fiscal sustainability strategies that 
have been successfully employed by a large American symphony orchestra and to 
provide concrete suggestions for orchestra managers seeking to improve their orchestra’s 
fiscal sustainability.  To accomplish this purpose, this document addresses the following 
questions: 
1. Which large American symphony orchestras are fiscally consistent? 
2. What are the factors that contribute to a large American orchestra’s fiscal 
consistency and fiscal sustainability? 
3. How can practitioners incorporate these practices into their own orchestras? 
To answer the first research question, the 2005–2011 tax form 990s of 25 large 
American orchestras were surveyed.  Total Income/Total Expense ratios were calculated 
for each orchestra, and five orchestras consistently achieved an income ratio of over 
100% from 2005 to 2011.  The five orchestras included the Los Angeles Philharmonic, 
St. Louis Symphony, Cincinnati Symphony, North Carolina Symphony, and Buffalo 
Philharmonic. 
To answer the second research question, one of the five orchestras was selected as 
the subject for a qualitative single-case study to determine what factors contributed to its 
fiscal consistency from 2005 to 2011.  While any of the orchestras might have been 
chosen as the case study subject, the North Carolina Symphony was selected due to the 
fact that it displayed high levels of government support that were disproportional to 
 
 
 
sector norms.  Analysis from the case study indicated that while government funding was 
a crucial income source for the North Carolina Symphony, the orchestra’s fiscal 
sustainability was primarily derived from community engagement, fostered by the North 
Carolina Symphony’s clarity of mission that translated into community-oriented program 
activities. Secondary fiscal sustainability strategies included transparency, leveraging 
human resources, and a service mindset. 
To answer the third research question, the last section of the document contains 
practical suggestions derived from the case study analysis to be employed by orchestra 
practitioners who seek to improve their organization’s fiscal sustainability. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 Symphony orchestras are among the great cultural treasures of the United States 
of America. Their performances convey the depth of human experience, offering hope 
and inspiration.
1
 Long considered the hallmark of a cultured city,
2
 they contribute to a 
community’s artistic vibrancy and are an essential component of a thriving arts and 
culture scene, generating civic pride and offering an avenue for social connection.
3
 As a 
part of the creative economy, orchestras also enhance a city’s economic development,
4
 
attracting business leaders, philanthropists, and civic-minded citizens, thus improving the 
area’s overall quality of life.
5
 
However, for several decades, American symphony orchestras have struggled as a 
field to maintain financial stability. Within the past twenty-five years, over one dozen 
American orchestras have declared bankruptcy, folded or temporarily suspended 
operations,
6
 including major orchestras such as the Philadelphia Orchestra, Cleveland 
Orchestra, Minnesota Orchestra, Detroit Symphony Orchestra, and Atlanta Symphony.
7
 
In a recently published (2012) study by Stanford economist Robert J. Flanagan, 46 of the 
                                                          
1
 Woodcock, “Why Music is Important.” 
2
 Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, 182. 
3
 Woodcock. 
4
 United States, Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, “2011 Return of Organization Exempt 
from Income Tax (Form 990): North Carolina Symphony,” 34.  
5
 League of American Orchestras, “Quick Orchestra Facts 2015 (Data from 2011–12),” 2. 
6
 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 2–3. 
7
 Woodcock. 
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63 largest orchestras in America ran deficits on average from 1987 through 2005, while 
only 17 of the orchestras achieved surpluses on average.
8
 American symphony orchestras 
typically have status as Internal Revenue Core (IRC) 501(c)(3) public charities, and as 
nonprofit organizations, their primary purpose is to fulfill a social mission, rather to than 
to generate profit for owners and shareholders. However, without resources and solid 
financial grounding, it is impossible for any nonprofit, including an orchestra, to fulfill its 
mission.
9
 As such, in order to ensure the lasting legacy of the American symphony 
orchestra, it is vital for the field to achieve financial stability and sustainability.  
Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this document is to identify fiscal sustainability strategies that 
contribute to the fiscal consistency of large American symphony orchestras as well as to 
provide concrete suggestions for orchestra managers seeking to improve their orchestra’s 
fiscal sustainability. I chose to concentrate on large orchestras because the majority of 
academic discussion on American orchestra economics focuses on large orchestras, 
which generate and incur the approximately 70% of the field’s annual revenue and 
expenses.
10
 
To accomplish this purpose, this document intends to address the following 
questions: 
1. Which large American symphony orchestras are fiscally consistent? 
                                                          
8
 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 2. 
9
 Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, and Gonzalez Morganti, “Financial Sustainability for Nonprofit 
Organizations,” 3. 
10
 Dempster, “The Wolf Report and Baumol’s Curse,” 2. 
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2. What are the factors that contribute to a large American orchestra’s fiscal 
consistency and fiscal sustainability? 
3. How can practitioners implement these practices in their orchestras? 
Definitions 
 This paper employs the followings terms and definitions: 
- American symphony orchestra: a symphony orchestra of the United States 
of America. 
- Cost disease: the economic phenomenon in which an orchestra’s expenses 
(particularly musician fees) generally rise faster than its ticket sales revenue as 
well as the U.S. economy.
11
 
- Dynamic capabilities: “organizational and strategic routines by which firms 
achieve new resource configurations”
12
 
- Fiscal consistency: regularly achieving a higher level of annual revenue than 
annual expenses. 
- Fiscal sustainability: the long-term application of fiscal consistency. 
- Income gap: the concept that an orchestra’s ticket sales revenue cannot cover 
the entirety of its operating cost; as such, orchestras must fill the income gap 
with additional revenue streams such as private contributions, government 
funding, endowment income, etc.
13
 
                                                          
11
 Baumol, “Symphony Orchestra Economics: The Fundamental Challenge,” 53.  
12
 Pablo et al., “Identifying, Enabling, and Managing Dynamic Capabilities in the Public Sector,” 688. 
13
 Baumol and Bowen, Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma, 147–148. 
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- Large symphony orchestra: a symphony orchestra with an annual budget of 
over $5 million.
14
 
- The field: the aggregate whole of American orchestras of all budget sizes. 
Organization and Research Methods 
This dissertation is organized by the following chapters: 
˗ Chapter II: Literature Review 
˗ Chapter III: Context of the American Orchestra Field 
˗ Chapter IV: North Carolina Symphony: A Case Study in Fiscal Sustainability 
Strategies for a Large American Orchestra 
˗ Chapter V: Implications for Practitioners 
The literature review in Chapter II provides a contextual financial framework by 
reviewing the American symphony orchestra field’s standard financial structure as well 
as its inherent flaws and limitations. It will also summarize the current state of American 
orchestra fiscal sustainability literature, as well as identify gaps in the literature. Chapters 
III through V respectively address each of the three presented research questions. 
Through a quantitative survey of the annual revenue and expenses reported in the tax-
form 990s of 25 large American orchestras, Chapter III quantitatively identifies five 
fiscally consistent orchestras with a consistently higher level of revenue than expenses 
from 2005 through 2011. To identify the qualitative factors that contribute to a large 
American orchestra’s fiscal sustainability, Chapter IV presents a case study modeled after 
                                                          
14
 Brooks and Symphony Orchestra Institute, Improving the Orchestra’s Revenue Position, 13. 
5 
 
the paradigms of Robert K. Yin
15
 interpreted through the theoretical frameworks of 
dynamic capabilities
16
 and a “resource-based” view.
17
 I selected a single-case study 
model because each of the identified fiscally consistent orchestras displayed dramatically 
different revenue strategies, thus making it difficult to conduct controlled side-by-side 
comparisons of all five orchestras. While any of the orchestras might have been chosen, I 
chose the North Carolina Symphony as my single-case study subject because it displayed 
high levels of government support that were disproportional to the field’s norms. As 
such, the case study will specifically reference the role of government funding in its fiscal 
sustainability strategy. Chapter V discusses how orchestra managers and leaders can 
incorporate practices from the case study’s findings into their own orchestras. 
 
 
  
                                                          
15
 Yin, Case Study Research, 38. 
16
 Pablo et al. 
17
 Pfeffer and Salancik, “The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.” 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
As noted by Erin V. Lehman in “Symphony Orchestra Organizations: 
Development of the Literature since 1960,” the genre of cultural economics with specific 
reference to American symphony orchestras emerged relatively recently, in the second 
half of the twentieth-century.
18
 For this reason, this literature review addresses works that 
span from 1966 through 2014. The review is thematically categorized by the following 
topics: 
1. Explanations of the American Orchestra’s Standard Financial Structure 
2. Analyses of the Financial Health of the American Orchestra Field 
3. Fiscal Sustainability Strategies for American Orchestras 
4. Fiscal Sustainability Case Studies of American Orchestras 
5. Discussions on the Government’s Role in Fiscal Sustainability 
The first two sections will provide a contextual financial framework for the reader: 
Section 1 will discuss the field’s standard financial structure as well as its inherent 
limitations, and Section 2 will provide an overview of the financial health of the field as a 
whole from 1966 through 2005. Sections 3 and 4 will respectively review research that 
broadly and specifically addresses orchestral fiscal sustainability, thus providing the 
                                                          
18
 Lehman, “Symphony Orchestra Organization: Development of the Literature since 1960,” 42. 
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reader with an overview of the current state of orchestral fiscal sustainability research. 
Section 5 discusses the role of government in orchestral fiscal sustainability, as it is 
frequently characterized as either a something that will lead to mission drift or as the 
ultimate solution that will resolve the field’s financial sustainability issues. 
Notably, the League of American Orchestras gathers the most comprehensive and 
reliable data on professional American symphony orchestras through its annual Orchestra 
Statistical Report.
19
 As such, several of the following sources, including the most 
influential and widely disseminated, heavily relied on the League’s data for their research 
(Baumol and Bowen, the Wolf Organization, Dempster, Flanagan, Hughes, etc.). 
Explanations of the American Orchestra’s Standard Financial Structure 
A variety of sources illuminate the standard financial structure employed by 
American symphony orchestras. Books that broadly address the topic of American 
symphony orchestras typically devote a chapter to standard revenue structures within the 
field. Examples include George Seltzer’s (1975) The Professional Symphony Orchestra 
in the United States, D. Kern Holoman’s (2012) The Orchestra: A Very Short 
Introduction and Samuel R. Rosenbaum’s (1967) contribution to The American 
Symphony Orchestra. Virtually every orchestra scholar points to the inevitable “income 
gap” that exists for every symphony orchestra–in other words, an orchestra’s ticket sales 
revenue cannot cover the entirety of its operating costs. As such, orchestras fill the 
income gap with additional revenue streams such as private contributions, government 
funding, corporate support, and endowment income.  
                                                          
19
 Dempster, 2–3. 
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Analyses of the Financial Health of the American Orchestra Field 
 In virtually every discussion regarding the financial health of American 
orchestras, the following three works serve as a foundation for subsequent analysis: 
- William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen’s (1966) Performing Arts, The 
Economic Dilemma: A Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music, 
and Dance 
- The Wolf Organization’s (1992) “The Financial Condition of Symphony 
Orchestras” 
- Robert J. Flanagan’s (2012) The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras: 
Artistic Triumphs and Economic Challenges  
Esteemed Princeton economists Baumol and Bowen (1966) present a thorough 
investigation of the economic condition of U.S. performing arts organizations with a 
heavy emphasis on symphony orchestras. In their analysis, Baumol and Bowen conclude 
not only that performing arts organizations “typically operate under financial strain”
20
 but 
that the financial pressures will inevitably worsen over time due to what the authors term 
as “stationary productivity.” They explain that in the instance of manufactured goods, 
technological advances and productivity increases will lead to greater efficiency and 
profits. Live arts performances, on the other hand, are prescribed a specific number of 
performers in order to present the works as intended by the composer or choreographer. 
Furthermore, Baumol and Bowen’s findings indicate that the costs to pay the performers 
will always rise faster than the performance revenue, creating a continually widening gap 
                                                          
20
 Baumol and Bowen, Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma, 161. 
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between revenue and costs. This phenomenon is widely known as “cost disease.” As 
Baumol succinctly explained in a (1996) interview with the Forum of the Symphony 
Orchestra Institute’s Harmony magazine, 
 
A Haydn symphony written to be performed by 30 musicians will require 15 
person-hours of human labor for an ‘authentic’ performance, no less than it did at 
the end of the 18th century. But elsewhere in the economy it takes less and less 
labor every year to produce a product . . . Thus, orchestra costs are condemned to 
rise every year, cumulatively, at a rate faster than the average of the economy’s 
prices; in other words, faster than the rate of inflation.”
21
  
 
Thus, Baumol and Bowen’s work calls into question the long-term financial viability of 
performing arts organizations, including symphony orchestras.  
Nearly thirty years later, the American Symphony Orchestra League (now League 
of American Orchestras) commissioned a consulting team to research the financial 
activities of American symphony orchestras in order to gain insight into the field’s fiscal 
health. Commonly referred to as the Wolf Report, the findings, conclusions, and future 
implications of the research are perhaps even more emphatic than those of Baumol and 
Bowen. In its overview, the report states: 
 
The orchestra industry is in financial crises . . . [and] appears to be in the worst 
financial shape it has ever be in by several objective measures. Unless changes 
are made in the way orchestras do business–changes that are substantial and 
systemic—the future health of the orchestra industry is in serious jeopardy. 
[emphasis in original]
22
  
 
                                                          
21
 Baumol, 53.  
22
 Wolf Organization and American Symphony Orchestra League, The Financial Condition of Symphony 
Orchestras, vi.  
10 
 
Notably, the report seems to corroborate Baumol and Bowen’s prediction of a continual 
income gap increase: the document reported that although the field now served more 
people per performance, the field’s annual deficit increased from nearly $3 million to 
over $23 million in a twenty-year period.
23
 
Presented at the 1992 American Symphony Orchestra League conference, the 
results of the Wolf Report immediately became well-known to the executives and 
managers of professional American orchestras and became a subject of significant 
controversy. While many orchestra managers, such as New York Philharmonic Managing 
Director Deborah Borda, embraced the Wolf report’s somber message, others adopted a 
more blasé attitude. In response to the Wolf Report, San Francisco Symphony Executive 
Director Peter Pastreichf staunchly maintained, “We do have a critical financial problem. 
The orchestras are spending more than they are taking in . . . But the situation is critical, 
not serious, and music will survive.” [emphasis in original]
24
 
In a decade-review Harmony magazine article, Douglas J. Dempster’s (2003) 
findings echo Pastreichf’s sentiments. Dempster’s analysis revealed that the Wolf 
Report’s predicted ten-year industry deficits did not come to pass and that the field 
actually increased its earned income revenue, thus preventing the industry income gap 
from increasing over the ten-year period. In conclusion, he triumphantly proclaimed that 
“orchestras are resisting a fate projected by the Wolf Report and foretold by Baumol’s 
Curse.”
25
  
                                                          
23
 Wolf Organization and American Symphony Orchestra League, iii. 
24
 Ibid., D–2. 
25
 Dempster, 14. 
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 Unfortunately, Stanford economist Robert J. Flanagan’s findings (2012) do not 
concur with Dempster’s conclusions. Compiling extensive data from the U.S.’s 63 largest 
orchestras over a twenty-year period, Flanagan employed statistical analysis to gain 
insight into the field’s financial condition. His findings concluded that the field is marked 
by chronic financial insecurity and budgetary deficits,
26
 and they also echoed predictions 
proffered by Baumol and Bowen: as the Princeton economists predicted, Flanagan found 
that from 1987 to 2005, the musicians’ pay increased at a faster rate than product 
productivity gains, leading to an increasing income gap in the field.
27
  
Fiscal Sustainability Strategies for American Orchestras 
Although academic orchestral literature thoroughly documents that the standard 
financial model of the American orchestra faces inherent difficulties that result in a 
precarious financial position for the field, few sources respond to this inherent problem 
with concrete strategies for fiscal sustainability. The Wolf Report calls for a paradigm 
shift that includes reducing the number of full-time players, utilizing multiple venues, and 
revitalizing school music-education programs,
28
 and Flanagan (2012) contends that 
orchestras must increase performance and nonperformance revenue while reducing 
expenses in order to combat the income gap.
29
 However, the primary focus of these 
sources is the current financial condition of the field, rather than on viable methods to 
combat the condition. In response to Flanagan’s early field research (2008), The 
Orchestra Forum (2008) created its The Elephant Task Force document, in which it 
                                                          
26
 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 2. 
27
 Ibid., 77. 
28
 Wolf Organization and American Symphony Orchestra League, A-17–A-20. 
29
 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 177. 
12 
 
presents three areas it concludes to be inextricably linked to a healthy financial structure 
(i.e., community relationships, internal culture, and artistic activities). However, The 
Elephant Taskforce does not cite scholarly research methods such as empirical data or 
orchestra case studies to support its ideas for potential solutions.
30
  
One notable exception is Arthur C. Brook’s research, which provides concrete 
fiscal strategies for orchestra managers supported by empirical and quantitative data. 
Brooks (1997) argues that an orchestra’s cost-disease can be remedied through increased 
demand for industry products (i.e., concerts) through methods such as recording, 
fundraising, and advertising. He presents two strategies to increase product demand: the 
Veblenian strategy and the Marshallian strategy. The Veblenian strategy positions the 
orchestra as a luxury experience for audience members with high social standing, while 
the Marshallian strategy positions the orchestra as an experience for the general public 
and specifically for the “uninitiated consumer” (i.e., a person that has never been to a 
symphony orchestra concert). Based on his statistical research, Brooks recommends the 
Veblenian strategy paired with a fundraising focus for smaller orchestras (orchestras with 
budgets under $5 million). For large orchestras (orchestras with budgets over $5 million), 
Brooks recommends the Marshallian strategy paired with advertising and perhaps 
recording.
31
  
Fiscal Sustainability Case Studies of American Orchestras 
Academic orchestral literature contains a variety of general case studies, such as 
those of Robert Craven (1986), and there are also case studies that focus on nonfinancial 
                                                          
30
 Orchestra Forum, “The Elephant Task Force: A Journey Toward New Visions for Orchestras,” 2–3. 
31
 Brooks, Improving the Orchestra’s Revenue Position: Practical Tactics and General Strategies, 13. 
13 
 
topics, such as the League of American Orchestras’ Fearless Journeys, which documents 
the innovative practices of five American orchestras. However, orchestra case studies 
rarely seem to focus on successful fiscal sustainability strategies. Philip Hart (1973) 
presents case studies of six American orchestras. In addition to providing general and 
administrative information on the orchestras, Hart delves into the financial difficulties of 
each orchestra with respect to the inevitable “income gap.” Although Hart does note 
some specific instances of financial success, his focus leans towards the orchestras’ 
current and future financial difficulties rather than the financial solutions of the individual 
orchestras.
32
  
By contrast, Edward Arian (1971) cites several fiscal sustainability strategies such 
as programming, record royalties, and increased touring, which enabled the Philadelphia 
Orchestra to obtain what he describes as a “comparatively strong” financial position. 
However, he cautions that while the cited strategies contributed to the organization’s 
financial stability, they also compromised the organization’s artistic integrity such that 
they had the potential to “destroy the organization.”
33
 Thus, while Arian presents 
“strategies” for fiscal sustainability, he does not present them as a template for other 
organizations to follow.  
TRG Arts, a private consulting company that specializes in helping arts 
organizations increase sustainable revenue streams, published two separate (2013) case 
studies that document how the Chicago
34
 and Albany
35
 symphony orchestras increased 
                                                          
32
 Hart, Orpheus in the New World, 139–294. 
33
 Arian, Bach, Beethoven, and Bureaucracy, 48–49. 
34
 TRG Arts, “Case Study: Chicago Symphony Orchestra.” 
35
 TRG Arts, “Case Study: Albany Symphony Orchestra.” 
14 
 
their ticket and subscription sales through adopting strategies recommended TRG Arts. 
However, although TRG’s case studies are informative and shed light on practices that 
have the potential to enable other orchestras to improve their financial stability, the 
studies are hardly objective due to the fact that they were published and promoted by the 
company that provided the services. 
Discussions on the Government’s Role in Fiscal Sustainability 
Frequently addressed in the discussion of orchestral fiscal sustainability is U.S. 
public policy and government’s role in maintaining its orchestras. Although the level of 
government support for American orchestras has varied throughout the last century, 
government funding generally has not exceeded more than 10% of an American 
orchestra’s operating expenses.
36
 Advocates for a higher level of government support 
point out that the continental European and Japanese governments view their orchestras 
as a public service
37
 and support their orchestras at a much higher monetary level than the 
U.S. government. For example, in 1985, the continental European and Japanese 
governments respectively provided their orchestras on average with 73% and 48.7% of 
their orchestras’ total revenue, whereas the United States funded just 9.7% of its 
orchestras’ total revenue in the same year.
38
 In light of this discrepancy, some scholars 
contend that the U.S. government should increase funding for its orchestras. As 
referenced in the Wolf Report, a McKinsey report (1972) argued that American 
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 Brooks and Rand Graduate School, Arts, Markets, and Governments, 74. 
37
 Guillard, “The Symphony as a Public Service.” 
38
 Brooks and Rand Graduate School, Arts, Markets, and Governments, 74. 
15 
 
orchestras would eventually cease to be financially viable unless the U.S. government 
increased its level of support to 20–25% of its orchestra’s operating expenses.
39
 
On the other hand, other scholars are quick to point out the inherent drawbacks of 
direct government funding. Flanagan notes that government subsidies of symphony 
orchestras have historically been “a difficult political sell in the United States” and that 
“in an era of large structural government deficits, long-term direct government support to 
orchestras seems unlikely in the United States.”
40
 Historically, orchestra managers have 
also feared the “government interference” that could result from high levels of subsidies
41
 
and potentially lead to mission drift. Various contemporary scholars are also wary of high 
levels of government funding. For instance, a study of American orchestras (2006) 
concluded that high levels of government support are correlated with low levels of 
overall fiscal health.
42
 
Economic theory suggests that government subsidies have the potential to 
displace or “crowd-out” private donations
43
 because they can create a perception of less 
financial need.
44
 However, recent studies have not found this to be conclusive. Based on 
the data from his study, Brooks (1998) concluded that government funding neither 
leverages nor crowds out private donations to symphony orchestras.
45
 Similarly, Thomas 
More Smith (2007) concluded that his data did not provide any evidence that government 
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 Macomb and Wooster, “How to Resolve the Growing Financial Crisis of Our Symphony Orchestras.” 
40
 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 110–111. 
41
 Hart, 379. 
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funding crowded out private donations to orchestras, but in fact indicated that 
government funding potentially had a modest “crowd-in” effect.
46
 Patricia C. Hughes 
(2014) also concluded that government funding has a significant crowd-in effect for 
private donations to symphony orchestras, although the data also indicated that the 
government funds have a small crowd-out effect on foundation giving.
47
 
Conclusion 
Academic orchestral literature indicates that the standard financial structure of the 
American orchestra faces inherent difficulties that arise from the income gap and cost 
disease. Thus, in order for an orchestra to be financially sustainable, it must somehow 
manage to overcome the income gap and cost disease. Orchestra literature thoroughly 
documents that from the mid-twentieth century through present day, the American 
symphony orchestra field as a whole has struggled to fill the income gap and treat cost 
disease. It does not, however, thoroughly document concrete fiscal sustainability 
strategies that have been employed to successfully overcome the income gap and cost 
disease. Some sources suggest various strategies for fiscal sustainability, but the 
strategies are generally are not supported by scholarly research and empirical evidence. 
The few sources that do cite fiscal sustainability strategies supported by empirical 
evidence do not name specific orchestras that have successfully employed the strategies 
to achieve fiscal consistency, such as the works of Arthur C. Brooks. Furthermore, the 
orchestra literature as has a dearth of financial case studies, making it difficult for 
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practitioners to learn from and adopt the fiscal sustainability strategies of identified 
fiscally consistent orchestras. Thus, academic orchestral literature tends to focus more on 
the financial problems of the field rather than on potential solutions. Although it is 
typically fraught with controversy, one potential solution that is frequently brought up is 
government funding, as the U.S. government funds its orchestras at a far lower rate than 
many foreign governments fund their orchestras. However, the academic literature does 
not thoroughly document specific American orchestras that have successfully secured 
disproportionately high levels of government support as a fiscal sustainability strategy. 
Within the literature, a wealth of information exists that describes the general 
financial state of the field as a whole. This is largely due to the extensive data gathered 
through the League of American Orchestras’ Statistical Report, which is considered to be 
the most comprehensive and reliable source of information for the field, and as 
mentioned previously, several of the cited sources in this review relied heavily on data 
provided by the League of American Orchestras in order to complete their analysis 
(Baumol and Bowen, the Wolf Organization, Dempster, Flanagan, Hughes, etc.). 
However, there is a gap in the literature in regards to fiscal sustainability strategies and 
financial case studies that feature orchestras with strong financial performance. While it 
may seem natural to turn to the League of American Orchestra’s Statistical Report to 
identify specific orchestras with a solid financial track record, the League abides by a 
strict confidentially agreement with its participants. The Statistical Report is available 
only to orchestras that participate in the annual survey,
48
 and academics are granted 
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access to select data for their research under the condition that the identities of the 
orchestras are not linked to their corresponding data.
49
  
As of this writing, the literature does not thoroughly address the following 
questions: 
- Which specific large American orchestras are strong financial performers?  
- What are the factors that contribute to an orchestra’s fiscal sustainability? 
- How can these fiscal sustainability strategies be adapted into a template for 
other orchestra managers to employ in their own orchestra? 
This document intends to contribute to the literature by identifying concrete fiscal 
strategies that have been successfully employed by a large American symphony orchestra 
with the hope that other orchestra managers can incorporate the strategies into the 
practices of their organizations.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
FINANCIAL CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN ORCHESTRA FIELD, 2005–2011  
 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter II, current orchestral literature generally does not identify the 
specific orchestras that consistently have a higher level of revenue than expenses. This is 
largely due to the fact that the bulk of the financial data used in economic surveys is 
acquired from the League of American Orchestras, which has gathered extensive data 
from American orchestra for sixty-five years. Each year, the League generates an Annual 
Statistical Report. Containing far more than just orchestral financial information, the 
annual reports also contain information such as orchestra programming choices and 
musician demographics. Designed as a strategic and business planning tool for orchestra 
managers,
50
 approximately 200 American orchestras voluntarily submit their information 
to the League each year.
51
 Participating orchestras have access to the League’s Annual 
Statistical Report and may also request customized reports.
52
  
Because the League’s statistical reports are considered to contain the most 
comprehensive and reliable data on the American orchestra field,
53
 scholars and 
researchers desire to access the data. However, in order to gain access to the information, 
researchers must submit a formal application to the League and agree to abide by the 
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League’s user agreement, including agreeing not to publish information that reveals the 
identities of specific orchestras.
54
 As a result, while orchestra literature contains a wealth 
of financial information about the field as a whole, very little research has been published 
on the financial state of specific individual orchestras. In an effort to help fill this gap, I 
crafted my own study to identify fiscally consistent large American orchestras.  
Methodology of Study 
 Because the literature does not identify the field’s strong financial performers, I 
chose to survey multiple large orchestras to pinpoint the fiscally consistent orchestras. 
Constituting less than 5% of all American orchestras, there are approximately 60 large 
orchestras in the United States.
55
 I chose to survey 25 of those orchestras. Orchestras 
were chosen across a variety of budgets: seven of the selected orchestras had a budget of 
over $50 million; eight of the orchestras had a budget between $20 million and $50 
million, and seven had a budget between $5 million and $20 million. Every major region 
in the United States was represented in the sample. For a complete list of the surveyed 
orchestras, please refer to Appendix A. 
 I acquired each orchestra’s annual expense and income and revenue stream 
distribution through their published IRS tax-form 990, and I chose a seven-year time 
boundary of 2005 through 2011. The year 2005 was chosen as a starting point because 
the last major work on the economic health of American orchestras (Flanagan’s The 
Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras) employed data through 2005. The year 2011 was 
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chosen as an ending point because 2011 was the last fiscal year for which tax-form 990 
data was consistently available at the time I conducted my study. 
After compiling the orchestras’ data from the seven-year period, I used the 
following equation to determine the orchestras’ income ratios for each year: Income 
Ratio = Total Income / Total Expense. 
In the identification of fiscally consistent orchestras, orchestras that achieved an 
income ratio of higher than 100% every year from 2005–2011 were automatically 
included in the list of fiscally consistent orchestras. Because the 2009 economic recession 
resulted in a drastic reduction in revenue across the American arts and culture field for 
that year,
56
 orchestras were permitted to have a 2009 income ratio as low as 85% without 
being eliminated from the list of fiscally consistent orchestras. Orchestras were also 
permitted to have additional one year in which their income ratio was as low as 95%.  
If orchestras did not meet the above criterion, they were automatically discarded from the 
list of fiscally consistent orchestras. 
 In order to gain a better understanding of the revenue streams of the identified 
fiscally consistent orchestras, I recorded the specific dollar amount of revenue obtained 
within each broad revenue category as indicated on the orchestras’ tax-form 990s. I 
subsequently calculated the revenue ratios for each identified orchestra, using the 
following ratio formulas: 
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˗ Private Contributions/Total Revenue 
˗ Government Support/Total Revenue  
˗ Program Service Revenue/Total Revenue 
˗ Investment Income/Total Revenue 
˗ Other/Total Revenue  
Background: Expenses and Revenue for the American Orchestra Field 
According to the League of American Orchestras, 2012 tax-form 990 filings 
indicated that 1,372 orchestras existed in the United States, with field expenses totaling 
nearly $1.8 billion. Of those orchestras, the vast majority had annual budgets under $5 
million: 84.1% had annual budgets under $1 million, and 11.3% had a budget between $1 
million and $5 million. 2.6% of the orchestras had a budget between $5 million and $20 
million, and 1.3% had a budget between $20 million and $50 million. Less than 1% 
(0.7%) of the orchestras had an annual budget of over $50 million.
57
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, every orchestra in the United States supplements its 
ticket sales revenue with additional income streams, which are primarily private 
contributions (individual donations and foundation grants), government support, and 
investment income (generally from an endowment fund). Other revenue forms can 
include hall rentals, parking and concessions, and recording royalties.
58
 As such, 
orchestral revenue streams can be divided into the following five broad categories: 
Private Contributions, Government Support, Program Service Revenue, Investment 
Income, and Other. 
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In 2012, 46.7% of the field’s revenue was obtained through private contributions; 
4.6% was obtained through government support; 33.4% came from concert revenue; 
5.0% came from investment income, and 10.3% came from “other” revenue streams.
59
 As 
such, the field’s largest sources of revenue were private contributions (nearly half of its 
total revenue) and concert revenue (one-third of its total revenue). Investment income, 
government, and other forms of revenue accounted for less than 15% of the field’s total 
revenue. 
While these figures represent the average distribution of revenue for American 
orchestras, they do not indicate a “standard model” of revenue distribution for most 
American orchestras. For example, the field’s 2005 revenue distribution closely 
resembled the revenue distribution in 2012: private contributions comprised 45% of the 
field’s revenue; government support comprised 5%; concert revenue comprised 37%, and 
investment income comprised 13%.
60
 However, the total range for each category was 
very broad. Private contributions ranged from 18% to 66%; government subsidies ranged 
from 0.2% to 28%; concert revenue ranged from 18% to 74%, and investment income 
ranged from -2% to 36%. As a result, Flanagan asserts that “individual U.S. orchestras do 
not follow a common financial model.”
61
 
Results 
 After calculating the income ratios for the twenty-five orchestras, five orchestras 
fit the pre-specified guidelines of fiscal consistency: the Los Angeles Philharmonic, 
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Cincinnati Symphony, St. Louis Symphony, North Carolina Symphony, and the Buffalo 
Philharmonic. Notably, the five identified orchestras ran the gamut in budget size and 
geographic location. One orchestra had an annual budget of over $50 million (the Los 
Angeles Philharmonic), two orchestras had annual budgets between $20 million and $50 
million (Cincinnati and St. Louis Symphonies), and two of the orchestras had annual 
budgets between $5 million and $20 million (North Carolina Symphony and Buffalo 
Philharmonic). One orchestra resided on the West Cost, two resided in the Midwest, one 
resided in the North East, and one resided in the Southeast. The population of each 
orchestra’s home city also varied. According to U.S. census data, Los Angeles had a 
population of approximately 9.8 million in 2010, while Cincinnati, St. Louis, Raleigh, 
and Buffalo had populations between 260,000 and 403,000 (respectively, the cites had 
2010 populations of approximately 297,000; 319,000; 403,000; and 260,000).
62
 
Table 3.1 lists the five orchestras and their income ratios from 2005 to 2011. For a table 
with the dollar amount of each orchestra’s revenue and expenses, please refer to 
Appendix B. As evident from Table 3.1, the Los Angeles Philharmonic, Cincinnati 
Symphony, and North Carolina Symphony experienced noticeable negative income gaps 
in 2009 (the orchestras respectively achieved 93%, 92% and 85% income ratios). The 
Cincinnati Symphony and the North Carolina Symphony also experienced small income 
gaps in 2008, respectively achieving income ratios of 97% and 99%, respectively. Two of 
orchestras (the St. Louis Symphony and the Buffalo Philharmonic) maintained an income 
ratio of over 100% for the entirety of the time period. 
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Table 3.1 
Income-to-Expense Ratios of Five American Orchestras, 2005–2011 
Symphony 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Los Angeles 
Philharmonic 
109% 116% 120% 116% 93% 117% 106% 
Cincinnati Symphony 104% 109% 105% 97% 92% 106% 112% 
St. Louis Symphony 229% 123% 116% 106% 126% 103% 103% 
North Carolina 
Symphony 
104% 106% 104% 99% 85% 109% 103% 
Buffalo Philharmonic 102% 104% 112% 112% 103% 101% 100% 
Note. Orchestras are listed in descending order of budget size. 
 
Table 3.2 details the revenue ratios of the five identified American orchestras 
from 2005 through 2011. For table with each orchestra’s actual revenue numbers, please 
refer to Appendix C. Notably, in the surveyed time period, each orchestra appears to have 
employed unique revenue strategy with proportionally different revenue streams. The Los 
Angeles Philharmonic’s program service revenue consistently comprised over two-thirds 
of its annual revenue, ranging from 64% to 81% of its total annual income. Orchestras’ 
tax-form 990s generally do not contain detailed break downs of the components of its 
program service revenue, but the Los Angeles Philharmonic’s forms listed the following 
broad categories: concert sales, ticket sales, concessions, parking, and recording 
royalties.
63
 The remainder of its income came primarily from private contributions, 
comprising approximately one-quarter to one-third of its budget. The symphony 
orchestra’s investment income comprised 1% to 3% of its revenue (with the exception of 
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2009, in which it experienced a significant loss), and government support comprised 0% 
to 2% of its total revenue. 
 
Table 3.2 
Revenue Ratios of Five American Orchestras, 2005–2011  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Los Angeles 
Philharmonic 
Private Contributions 29% 25% 28% 31% 27% 33% 29% 
Government Support 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Program Service Revenue 68% 70% 64% 67% 81% 64% 67% 
Investment Income 1% 2% 3% 2% -8% 3% 3% 
Other 2% 2% 4% 0% -1% 0% 0% 
Cincinnati 
Symphony 
Private Contributions 30% 34% 30% 32% 36% 26% 33% 
Government Support 1% 1% 1% 8% 1% 0% 1% 
Program Service Revenue 58% 52% 59% 61% 68% 60% 57% 
Investment Income 2% 3% 3% -1% -6% 13% 9% 
Other 8% 10% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
St. Louis 
Symphony 
Private Contributions 73% 55% 48% 44% 51% 42% 41% 
Government Support 3% 1% 6% 1% 4% 2% 5% 
Program Service Revenue 12% 21% 22% 25% 23% 31% 31% 
Investment Income 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
Other 9% 21% 22% 29% 21% 25% 23% 
 
North 
Carolina 
Symphony  
 
 
Private Contributions 33% 37% 37% 40% 31% 30% 33% 
Government Support 28% 25% 25% 24% 29% 37% 38% 
Program Service Revenue 35% 32% 31% 30% 33% 27% 28% 
Investment Income 3% 3% 4% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 2% 3% 2% 2% 6% 6% 1% 
 
 Buffalo 
 Philharmonic 
 
 
 
Private Contributions 57% 52% 57% 53% 55% 48% 51% 
Government Support 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 15% 10% 
Program Service Revenue 31% 34% 30% 32% 31% 35% 35% 
Investment Income 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 0% 1% 2% 4% 3% 2% 4% 
Note. Orchestras are listed in descending order of budget size. 
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The Cincinnati Symphony’s program service revenue also comprised the bulk of 
its program service revenue, ranging from half to two-thirds of its income, and its private 
contributions comprised the majority of its remaining revenue, ranging from one quarter 
to one-third of its income. Although it had a spike in government support (8%) in 2008 
and a dip in 2010 (0%), government support comprised 1% of its annual revenue in the 
remaining years. The symphony’s investment income varied widely throughout the 
period, with a low of -6% in 2009 and a high of 13% in 2010. Its “Other” category also 
varied, ranging from 7% to 10% from 2005 to 2007 and drop to 0% for the remaining 
years. 
By contrast, the St. Louis Symphony’s largest revenue stream was private 
contributions, ranging from 41% to 73%. The remaining revenue primarily came from 
program service revenue and “other,” respectively ranging from 21% to 31% and 21% to 
29% over the course of 2006 to 2009 (because private contributions were 
disproportionately high in 2005, program service revenue and “other” respectively 
comprised just 12% and 9%). Government support ranged from 1% to 6% of its total 
revenue, and investment income ranged from 0% to 3%, steadily declining to 0% over the 
seven-year period.  
 Unlike the previous three orchestras, the North Carolina Symphony did not have a 
single revenue stream that comprised the majority of its total income. Instead, it had a 
balanced and diversified revenue stream package. Private contributions and program 
service revenue generally each comprised approximately one third of its total revenue 
each year. Notably, government support ranged from one quarter to one-third of its 
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revenue, which is quite unusual in the American orchestral field. As previously stated, 
government funds comprise less than 5% of the American orchestra field’s total revenue. 
The symphony’s investment income ranged from 0% to 5% over the time period, and its 
“other” revenue ranged from 1% to 6%. 
 As in the case of the St. Louis Symphony, the Buffalo Philharmonic’s private 
contributions generally comprised over half of its income, ranging from 48% to 57%, and 
its program service revenue comprised approximately one-third of its income. While its 
government support was not nearly as high as that of the North Carolina Symphony, its 
level of support was nevertheless over twice the field average, ranging from 10% to 15% 
of its income. The Buffalo Philharmonic’s “other” revenue comprised 1% to 4% of its 
total income. Notably, while endowment income is often considered to be an essential 
component to an orchestra’s fiscal sustainability plan, the Buffalo Philharmonic 
successfully achieved a positive Total Income/Total Expenses ratio every year from 2005 
to 2011 with 0% of endowment income comprising its total revenue.  
Thus, each of the five identified orchestras followed a very different revenue 
profile. 
Conclusion 
In order to identify the large American orchestras that are fiscally consistent, I 
surveyed twenty-five orchestras with budgets of over $5 million, calculating each 
orchestra’s annual Total Income/Total Expense ratio over a seven-year period (2005–
2011). Of the twenty-five orchestras, five consistently achieved an income ratio of over 
100%. They are listed below by budgetary size in descending order: 
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1. Los Angeles Philharmonic 
2. Cincinnati Symphony 
3. St. Louis Symphony 
4. North Carolina Symphony 
5. Buffalo Philharmonic 
For each of the financially consistent orchestras, I recorded their revenue streams 
by IRS Tax-Form 990 category: Private Contributions (i.e., individual donations and 
foundation grants), Government Support (i.e., government grants), Program Service 
Revenue (i.e., ticket sales), Endowment Income, and Other. I subsequently calculated the 
annual revenue stream to total revenue ratio for each orchestra in order to ascertain the 
“revenue package” of each orchestra.  
In The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, Flanagan notes that “individual 
orchestras do not follow a common financial model,” meaning that while virtually every 
orchestra has the same revenue categories, the proportional makeup of each orchestra’s 
revenue package varies widely.
64
 This proved to be true in the resultant revenue ratios of 
the five top-performing financial orchestras of my study, which had extremely varied 
revenue packages and dramatically different revenue emphases in comparison to field 
revenue averages from 2011–2012. The Los Angeles Philharmonic displayed an 
extremely high level of program service revenue (over two-thirds of the orchestra’s 
annual revenue). It had virtually no government support or investment income (generally 
less than 2% each). The Cincinnati Symphony displayed an unusually high level of 
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program service revenue (between half and two-thirds of the orchestra’s income). The St. 
Louis Symphony displayed an extremely high level of “other” (with the exception of 
2005, the orchestra’s “other” revenue ranged from 20% to 29%). From 2005 to 2009, it 
displayed an unusually low program service revenue (12% to 25%). The North Carolina 
Symphony displayed an extremely high level of government support (between one-
quarter to one-third of the annual revenue package). Its remaining revenue was split fairly 
evenly between private contributions and earned income. The Buffalo Symphony 
displayed high level of government support (ranging between 10 and 15%) and 
moderately high level of private contributions (over half of its revenue). It had virtually 
no investment income in the surveyed time period (0% each year).  
This preliminary study has several implications for future quantitative and 
qualitative research. Quantitatively, the study could be expanded to include every 
American orchestra with a budget over $5 million (approximately sixty orchestras) in 
order to identify additional fiscally consistent orchestras. Additional studies could also 
examine the expense ratios of fiscally consistent orchestras to identify consistent 
spending patterns that contribute to fiscal consistency in American orchestras. 
As stated in Chapter II, the bulk of the quantitative analysis on the orchestral field 
is based on data provided by the League of American Orchestras. Because the League has 
strict confidentiality agreements with its users, specific orchestras may not be identified 
in the data analysis. As a result, the analysis generally pertains to the generalizations 
about the whole of the field and does not identify the orchestras that are fiscally 
consistent. However, every American orchestra’s financial information is publically 
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available in their IRS tax-form 990s through websites such as the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, GuideStar, and the Foundation Center’s 990 Finder. As a result, all 
of the financial data is publically available for analysis, but it not organized in a way that 
is conducive for analysis. An independent third party organization could create a free 
web-based data system that annually culls 990 tax-form data of every American orchestra 
with a budget over $5 million. The system could also be programmed to calculate 
financial ratios for each orchestra, including income, revenue, and expense ratios. Users 
would also be able to create customizable reports–for instance, they would be able to 
filter orchestras by budget size or geographic region. The third party-organization could 
also contract industry experts and economists to write analytical articles about the 
financial data.  
A data system like this would have three key benefits. Firstly, it would provide a 
greater level of transparency to the field, potentially bolstering trust with the public
65
 and 
encouraging increased and more thoughtful charitable giving from private and 
government funders.
66
 Because the system would be updated annually as each orchestra 
publishes its form-990, the system would always reflect the current financial condition of 
the orchestra field. The users would also be able to retrieve information from prior years 
in order to directly compare the field’s current and past states and to detect financial 
trends within the field. By contrast, the American League of Symphony Orchestra 
annually publishes a “Quick Facts” report for the public, but the report generally uses 
data from prior years (e.g., the League’s 2015 Quick Facts Sheet data is derived from 
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data from 2011-2012). Additionally, as of this writing, the League does not keep Quick 
Facts from prior years on its website.
67
 If users wish to access prior Quick Facts, they 
must request the sheets directly from the League.  
 Secondly, the proposed system would be a valuable tool for orchestra 
researchers. While researchers can currently access comprehensive and accurate data 
through the League of American Orchestra’s Annual Statistical report, there are some 
limitations to this method. Researchers must submit a formal written request to the 
League and wait for approval; by contrast, the information on the proposed database 
would be immediately accessible. Additionally, as stated previously, researchers may not 
identify any orchestras through information obtained from the League of American 
Orchestras. The proposed database would allow researchers to easily access public 
information on individual orchestras, and researchers would be legally able to cite 
specific orchestras as necessary if it enhanced their research.  
Thirdly, the system would be a powerful tool for orchestra leaders and managers. 
In The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, Flanagan argues that the wide “variance in 
actual practice raises the question of how much symphony orchestras learn from each 
other’s policies and experiences” and that “best practices” are not emulated from one 
orchestra to another.
 68
 This may be partially due to the fact that much of the field’s 
quantitative analysis is shrouded in anonymity, making it difficult to pinpoint the 
orchestras that have financial models worth emulating. The proposed system would allow 
orchestra practitioners to easily identify fiscally consistent orchestras as well as 
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successful “peer orchestras” of a similar budget size. Likewise, if an orchestra manager 
wished to increase a particular revenue stream within their orchestra (e.g., government 
funding or program service revenue), he or she would be able to use the proposed 
database to identify peer orchestras that consistently achieve a disproportionally high 
level of the desired revenue stream. Ideally, the practitioner would be able subsequently 
to reach out to and directly learn from the peer orchestra. However, even if the orchestra 
proved unwilling to collaborate, the orchestra practitioner would still be able to research 
the practices of the peer orchestra through published online and media sources. 
This preliminary study also has implications for future qualitative research. The 
study identifies five fiscally consistent orchestras and it calculates the proportion of each 
broad revenue category within each orchestra’s total income. However, it does not 
identify the fiscal sustainability strategies that enabled each orchestra managed to achieve 
their revenue streams. For instance, the study reveals that the North Carolina Symphony 
had a higher level of government support throughout the time period than was typical for 
the field, and it reveals that the Los Angeles Philharmonic had significantly more 
program service revenue than average for the field. Qualitative case studies on each 
orchestra could shed light on each orchestra’s fiscal sustainability strategies contributing 
to their financial consistency. Lessons gleaned from the case studies could also provide 
practical implications for practitioners.  
Chapter IV of this document will provide a qualitative single-case study on the 
fiscal sustainability strategies of the North Carolina Symphony, and Chapter V will offer 
practical implications for practitioners based on findings from the single-case study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE NORTH CAROLINA SYMPHONY: A CASE STUDY IN FISCAL 
SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES FOR A LARGE AMERICAN ORCHESTRA 
 
Introduction 
Chapter III quantitatively identified five large American orchestras that 
consistently achieved a higher level of revenue than expenses from 2005 through 2011. 
Through a qualitative single-case study approach, Chapter IV will identify fiscal 
sustainability strategies contributing to the fiscal consistency of one of the orchestras: the 
North Carolina Symphony. Chapter IV will also examine the role of government funding 
in the North Carolina Symphony’s financial stability. 
A Single-Case Study Method: Rationales 
As noted in Chapter II, academic orchestral literature has a dearth of orchestral 
economic case studies. To answer my second research question, I adopted a case study 
method in order to help fill this gap. I chose a single-case study model for a variety of 
reasons. As Flanagan states in The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, individual 
American symphony orchestras have dramatically different financial models. While all 
orchestras share common revenue streams such as private contributions, government 
support, and performance income, the proportional role of each revenue category varies 
widely from orchestra to orchestra.
69
 This certainly bore out in the five identified 
orchestras from Chapter III. For instance, the Los Angeles Philharmonic displayed a 
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consistently high level of earned income disproportional to field norms, and the North 
Carolina Symphony consistently showed disproportionately high levels of government 
support. As such, each orchestra has a varying level of dependence on each type of 
revenue stream, and the revenue streams consequently play a different role in each 
symphony’s fiscal sustainability strategies. Additionally, Flanagan contends that the 
“sheer variety of [financial] policies” practiced by individual orchestras implies that there 
is no field standard for “best practice” for each financial issue.
70
 Thus, it would be 
difficult to conduct a controlled side-by-side comparison of all five orchestras.  
As Robert K. Yin states, “a single-case study is an appropriate design under 
several circumstances. First, recall that a single case study is analogous to a single 
experiment, and many of the same conditions that justify a single experiment also justify 
a single-case study.”
71
 One of his primary rationales for a single-case study is when “the 
case represents an extreme or unique case” [italics original].
72
 In the instance of the five 
identified orchestras, each one is a unique financial case, and two are extreme outliers 
when compared to field norms. 
Each of the five orchestras might have been selected for a qualitative single-case 
study in fiscal sustainability strategies. I selected the North Carolina Symphony as my 
subject for the study because I was intrigued by its high level of government support. As 
previously mentioned, government support for American symphony orchestra generally 
comprises less than 5% of total revenue for the entire field. With government support 
                                                          
70
 Flanagan, The Economic Environment of American Symphony Orchestras, 74–75. 
71
 Yin, 38. 
72
 Ibid., 39. 
36 
 
comprising 24–38% of its total revenue from 2005 to 2011, the North Carolina 
Symphony is a field outlier (i.e., it is an “extreme or unique case”). Interestingly, a 1972 
McKinsey report argued that American orchestras would eventually cease to be 
financially viable unless the U.S. government increased its level of support to 20–25% of 
its orchestra’s operating expenses.
73
 In reference to the McKinsey report, the Wolf Report 
grimly noted that this “high level of public subsidy never materialized.”
74
 However, this 
statement was not entirely accurate. In the case of the North Carolina Symphony, a high 
level of government support had, in fact, already materialized. For instance, in 1983, 
government support covered as much as 70% of the North Carolina Symphony’s total 
expenses,
75
 and while current levels of government support are not as high as 70%, they 
continue to be at (and even surpass) the levels recommended in the McKinsey report. 
Methodology of Study 
The design of this qualitative single-case study incorporates Yin’s essential 
research design components: 
1. Research questions(s) 
2. Proposition(s) 
3. Unit(s) of analysis  
4. Linking data to propositions 
5. Interpretation of findings76 
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The first three components refer to data collection.
77
 I have applied them as 
follows: 
1. Research Questions: What factors contributed to the North Carolina 
Symphony’s fiscal consistency from 2005 to 2011, and what were its fiscal 
sustainability strategies?  
2. Proposition: Government funding played a prominent role in the orchestra’s 
fiscal stability and fiscal sustainability strategies. 
3. Unit of Analysis: The North Carolina Symphony, with a specific time 
boundary of 2005–2011.
78
  
The North Carolina Symphony’s Historical Background 
I will also provide a brief historical background of the North Carolina Symphony 
that is informed by Robert R. Craven’s Symphony Orchestras of the United States as well 
as Hard-Circus Road: The Odyssey of the North Symphony, a first-person account by 
Benjamin Swalin. The organization’s historical background falls outside of the case 
study’s 2005–2011 timeframe. However, due to the fact that the symphony’s unique 
relationship with the North Carolina State government stems back to its formative years, 
an understanding of the organization’s historical background is crucial to the 
investigation of the research proposition and will result in a richer case study analysis. 
 The North Carolina Symphony has a long history of community engagement and 
government support. In the late 1920s,
79
 Lamar Stringfield, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
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composer and North Carolina native, had a vision of establishing a North Carolina state 
orchestra backed by government subsidy.
80
 Although the state of North Carolina denied 
Stringfield’s requests for funding due to the scarcity of financial resources in the midst of 
the Depression,
81
 Stringfield persevered and the North Carolina Symphony Society 
(NCSS) formed in 1932 “to study, encourage, and promote the establishment of a North 
Carolina Symphony Orchestra.”
82
 The symphony held its first demonstration concert later 
that year, featuring volunteer musicians from sixteen North Carolina communities.
83
 The 
orchestra soon extended its reach throughout the state of North Carolina, and within three 
years of its inception, the orchestra performed in over fifty towns across the state. By 
1937, it performed over 180 live concerts for over 100,000 audience members across the 
state of North Carolina. Unfortunately, due to severe financial difficulties, the symphony 
collapsed in 1937.
84
  
 However, even at the time of its collapse, conductor Benjamin Swalin dreamed of 
resurrecting and rebuilding the orchestra,
85
 so he and his wife, Maxine, spearheaded 
fundraising initiatives to revive the orchestra. By 1939, they raised sufficient funds to 
reform the orchestra,
86
 and Swalin was appointed as its new music director. 
 Under Swalin’s leadership, the symphony flourished and thrived. As Craven 
explains, “from [1939] to Swalin’s retirement in 1972, the history of the NCS is ‘the 
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story of the indomitable spirit and vision of Benjamin Swalin.’”
87
 Swalin immediately 
implemented a new personnel system that recruited “musicians of sufficient talent”
88
 and 
thus elevated the group’s artistic level. As the North Carolina Symphony 2005 Executive 
Summary points out, Swalin also led the organization in the continuation of its 
“grassroots emphasis of taking the orchestra to the people of the state.”
89
 To this end, the 
North Carolina Symphony Society restructured in 1942 and formed local chapters 
throughout the state to raise funds to bring North Carolina Symphony adult and 
children’s concerts to their community. 
Swalin also successfully persuaded North Carolina Governor J. Melville 
Broughton to grant the orchestra state subsidization.
90
 In 1943 Senate Bill no. 248 
(affectionately referred to as the “Horn-Tootin’ Bill”) granted the orchestra a recurring 
subsidy of $2,000 each year from 1943–1945, making the North Carolina Symphony the 
first orchestra in American history to receive recurring state government support.
91
 As 
Benjamin Swalin wrote in Hard-Circus Road, the bill was a “major victory” for the 
symphony because it “gave the symphony not only financial support but official 
recognition and respectability.”
92
 Thus, in addition to providing the organization with 
crucial financial support, the government subsidy provided the orchestra with credibility 
in the community. 
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After Swalin retired in 1972, John Gosling was appointed as its new conductor, 
leading the orchestra through additional artistic and administrative expansions. Gosling 
retired in 1980, and a two-year search for a new music director followed.
93
 During this 
time, the symphony experienced significant financial difficulties: the organization had 
“lengthened the season, raised the musicians’ pay, and added players hired without 
keeping a prudent eye on revenues. [Financial] shortfalls had been paid for by plundering 
a new endowment.”
94
 A musician strike ensued, causing contributions and audience sizes 
to shrink, and many predicted an inevitable organizational collapse.
95
 To prevent an 
organizational catastrophe, the Symphony Society board took drastic measures and 
“sharply cut the length of the season, staff, and orchestra size.”
96
 
In 1982, Gerhardt Zimmermann was appointed as the orchestra’s new music 
director.
97
 Zimmermann helped the orchestra rise to a new artistic level: world-class 
guest artists began to perform with the orchestra, the board crafted a three-year plan to 
“build an orchestra of national quality”
98
 and the orchestra expanded its number of 
concerts. During this time, the orchestra stabilized financially, balancing its budget every 
year from 1982 to 1990 and raising $10 million for a new endowment. The organization 
also increased its earned revenue through strategic marketing efforts and reviving the 
local chapters as established in the 1940s.
99
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Zimmermann acted as the North Carolina Symphony’s music director until 2003, 
making his 21-year tenure with the group one of the longest professional music director 
appointments in U.S. history.
100
 In 2004, Grant Llewellyn was appointed as the next 
music director.
101
 
The North Carolina Symphony: Sources 
Data sources used to examine the North Carolina Symphony included the 
following documentation and archival records:
102
  
˗ Tax form-990s, with attached annual executive reports 
˗ Report to the Community 
˗ Media articles  
A large portion of the information was obtained through the North Carolina Symphony’s 
detailed annual Executive Overviews from 2005–2010, included as attachments to the 
orchestra’s filed tax form-990s. In 2011, the organization switched from its Executive 
Summaries to a Report to the Community, which it continues to release at the time of this 
writing. Because the Report to the Community is formatted differently from the 
Executive Overviews, some information available from 2005–2010 is unavailable for 
2011. The information culled from the sources provides a composite picture of the North 
Carolina Symphony’s administrative infrastructure, artistic product, and financial state 
during the case study time boundary of 2005–2011. This information will provide a 
foundation for the analysis that follows. 
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North Carolina Symphony: Mission 
Throughout the case-study’s time period, the official mission statement of the 
North Carolina Symphony underwent three changes. From 2005 through 2009, the North 
Carolina Symphony’s mission statement was “to present an orchestra of the highest 
artistic standard that enriches, entertains, and educates diverse audiences in a variety of 
settings and represents North Carolina as a leader in performance and music 
education.”
103
 In 2010, the mission statement was revised as follows: “The mission of the 
North Carolina Symphony is to be an orchestra of the highest artistic quality that 
embraces its dual legacies of statewide service and music education.”
104
 In 2011, the 
mission was modified to: “[The mission of the North Carolina Symphony is] to be North 
Carolina’s state orchestra, an orchestra achieving the highest level of artistic quality and 
performance standards, and embracing its dual legacies of statewide service and music 
education.”
105
 Alternatively, in the words of music director Grant Llewellyn during a 
media interview, “[Our mission is] to take great music, in all its forms, to the people of 
North Carolina, wherever they are.”
106
  
The North Carolina Symphony’s dual mission of statewide service and education 
dramatically impacts its artistic offerings. During the studied time period, the symphony 
annually performed approximately 175 full orchestra concerts, reaching nearly 250,000 
people each year. Although the orchestra’s “home” concert hall (Meymandi Hall) is 
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located in Raleigh,
107
 over half of the symphony’s concerts took place outside of the 
Triangle region each year
108
 (the Triangle region of North Carolina is comprised of 
Raleigh, Chapel Hill, Durham, and their surrounding cities
109
), occurring in 30–40 
counties throughout North Carolina. Of the 175 concerts, 25% to 34% were full orchestra 
concerts for public school children. Throughout the studied time period, between 50,000 
and 100,000 school children experienced a live North Carolina Symphony concert each 
year.
110
 
North Carolina Symphony: Artistic and Administrative Structure 
From 2005 through 2011, the North Carolina Symphony employed between 64 
and 69 full-time musicians. The symphony’s core conductors included Grant Llewellyn, 
Music Director (appointed in 2004) and William Henry Curry, Resident Conductor 
(appointed in 1995). Additional conducting staff during the case’s studied time period 
consisted of: 
- Joan Laundry, Assistant Conductor (NCS appointment occurred from 2006 to 
2009) 
- Andrew Litton, Principal Guest Conductor (NCS appointment occurred from 
2009 to 2010) 
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- Sarah Hicks, Associate Conductor (NCS appointment occurred from 2008 to 
2011)
111
 
From 2005 through 2011, the orchestra’s administrative structure underwent 
various modifications. From 2005 through 2007, the North Carolina Symphony had a 
four-part administrative structure with the following departments, each overseen by a 
Vice President: 
- Artistic Operations 
- Marketing 
- Development 
- Finance112 
In 2008, the symphony combined Marketing and Development into one 
department, renaming it “Patron Services.” As one of the executive overviews explains, 
“the Symphony adopted a patron-centered business model which unified administrative 
functions around customer needs and expectations. . . . Rather than making the arbitrary 
distinction between marketing and development (i.e., earned income versus contributed 
income), the new model is geared toward maximizing the lifetime relationship between 
patron and organization.”
113
 The purpose of the Patron Services department was to 
“foster support for the organization by acquiring new audiences, building and nurturing 
relationships, and securing the earned and contributed income necessary to support and 
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sustain the organization, including relationships with individuals, corporations, and 
foundations.”
114
 Thus, in 2008, the symphony’s administrative structure was comprised 
of the following departments: 
- Artistic Operations 
- Patron Services 
- Finance and Administration 
In 2009 and 2010, the symphony shifted back to a four-part administrative structure: 
- Artistic Operations 
- Audience Development115 (renamed “Marketing and Audience Development” 
in 2010) 
- Philanthropy  
- Finance and Administration  
In both 2009 and 2010, the purpose of Audience Development was to “foster support for 
the organization by developing new markets, acquiring new audiences, converting first-
time attendees into repeat customers, building and nurturing relationships, and providing 
communications support to the entire organization.” The purpose of Philanthropy was to 
“secure charitable investments to support and sustain the organization, including 
relationships with individuals, corporations, and foundations.”
116
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 Data on the organization’s administrative structure in 2011 was not available in its 
2011 Report to the Community. 
Throughout the period studied, the size of the North Carolina Symphony’s 
administrative team varied significantly. In 2005, the administrative team consisted of 25 
staff members,
117
 and the team expanded to 26 people in 2006 through 2007.
118
 In 2008, 
the administrative expanded to 39 positions,
119
 and in 2010, the team reduced to 35 staff 
members.
120
 Data is not available for the administrative team size in 2009 and 2011.  
North Carolina Symphony: Governance 
Throughout the period, the North Carolina Symphony had two boards: The North 
Carolina Symphony Society (NCSS) Board of Trustees and the North Carolina 
Symphony Foundation Board of Trustees. The purpose of the NCSS Board of trustees 
was to “serve as the governing body of the North Carolina Symphony, determine the 
organization’s mission and purpose, approve and monitor the organization’s program 
goals, engage in strategic planning, and review and approve the annual budget.”
121
 From 
2005 through 2007, the NCSS Board of Trustees had 57 members
122
 and expanded to 60 
members in 2008.
123
 By North Carolina statute, the North Carolina governor and 
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Superintendent of Public Instruction served as board members during the studied time 
period, as well as four appointees chosen by the governor. At the “symphony’s option,” 
board members also included the President of the North Carolina Symphony League and 
the Secretary of the Department of Cultural Resources. The remaining board members 
were “elected by the membership of the society.”
124
 
The Board of Trustees for the North Carolina Symphony Foundation stated 
purpose was to “hold and manage the Symphony’s endowment, safeguard assets in a 
manner consistent with prudent investment of endowment funds, and expend endowment 
income and capital for the exclusive use and benefit of the Symphony Society.” From 
2005 through 2010, the foundation’s board consisted of 18 members, with changing 
heads.
125
 The board expanded to 19 members in 2011.
126
 
North Carolina Symphony: Volunteers 
Throughout the case study’s time period, the symphony had over 400 volunteers 
that collectively volunteered nearly 16,500 hours each season. The symphony also 
leveraged local volunteer chapters throughout the state, which it defined as, “grassroots 
organizing groups that seek to bring the North Carolina Symphony to their local 
communities through the sale of concert tickets and fundraising.”
127
 From 2005 through 
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2008, the symphony’s local chapters ranged in number from twelve
128
 to fourteen.
129
 
Data on the number of chapters is not available for 2009–2011, although the symphony’s 
documents indicate that chapters operated from 2009–2011.
130
 
North Carolina Symphony: Finances 
From 2005–2010, the symphony’s annual expense consisted primarily of 
musician fees (i.e., fixed payroll and benefits). Overall, the organization’s breakdown of 
annual expenses was relatively consistent throughout the period. The total budgetary 
expense ratios ranged as follows: 
˗ Musicians: 44–48% 
˗ Guest Artists and “Other Expenses”: 16.8–19%  
˗ Concert Production and Conductors: 7.7–8.5%  
˗ Marketing: 6.5–10% 
˗ Development: 5–8% 
˗ Administration and other: 10–14% 
As mentioned previously, government support comprises a significant portion of the 
North Carolina Symphony’s total revenue. The bulk of this support comes from the North 
Carolina state government and its Department of Cultural Resources.  
 As depicted by Table 4.1, government funds from the state of North Carolina 
comprised between 19% and 35% of the North Carolina Symphony’s total annual 
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revenue. As depicted in Table 4.2, “other” government support (i.e., government funds 
from sources other than the state of North Carolina) comprised a small amount of the 
North Carolina Symphony’s total annual revenue. With the exception of 2009, “other” 
government funding sources never exceeded 2.3% of the North Carolina Symphony’s 
total revenue. 
 
Table 4.1 
North Carolina Symphony’s State Government Support
131
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 NC State 
Government 
Funding  
$2.6 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.86 
million 
$4.1 
million 
Not 
Available 
Total Revenue 
$9.8 
million 
$11 
million 
$11.5 
million 
$14.1 
million 
$13.7 
million 
$11.4 
million 
N/A 
% of Total 
Revenue 
27% 25% 21% 19% 21% 35% N/A 
 
Table 4.2 
North Carolina Symphony’s “Other” Government Support
132
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
“Other” 
Government 
Funding  
$179,000 $179,000 $277,630 $327,557 $489,043 $295,000 
Not 
Available 
% of Total 
Revenue 
2% 2% 2% 2% 4.3% 2.3% N/A 
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Of the state government funds, the vast majority was given as grant-in-aid. From 
2005 through 2007, the grant-in-aid was allocated across the orchestra’s entire operating 
budget.
133
 In 2009 and 2010, rather than being applied across the operating budget, the 
grant-in-aid was used “exclusively toward musician salaries and benefits.”
134
 Data 
regarding the specific allocation of the grant-in-aid in 2008 and 2011 is not available. 
 Throughout the time period, the symphony employed approximately eight 
employees of the Department of Cultural Resources, the most prominent of which were 
the Vice President of Marketing and the Director of Public Relations.
135
 The DCR funds 
that were not grant-in-aid were used as salary and benefits for the state employees as well 
as for “some administrative support such as postage and telephone costs.”
136
 
Notably, in 2010 and 2011, the state of North Carolina introduced a $1.5 million 
“challenge grant.” In addition to its $2.65 million subsidy from the DCR, the state 
promised the orchestra an additional $1.5 million in support if it could raise a certain 
amount of private support. The North Carolina Symphony successfully secured the 
challenge grant both years.
137
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From 2005 through 2010, the North Carolina Symphony’s endowment operated 
under a current spending rule of “4.5% of a rolling-twelve quarter average of asset 
market value.”
138
 Table 4.3 indicates the size of the endowment. 
 Thus, from 2005 to 2010, the endowment decreased from $7.7 million to $7.14 
million. From 2005 through 2007, it increased annually, peaking at $9.4 million. Data for 
2008 and 2011 is not available. 
 
Table 4.3 
North Carolina Symphony Endowment Size
139
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Endowment 
Size  
$7.7 
million 
$8 
million 
$9.4 
million 
Not 
Available 
$7.4 
million 
$7.14 
million 
Not 
Available 
 
In 2005, the symphony’s tax-form 990 indicated a small net-asset deficit of  
-$212,000.
140
 In 2006, the symphony eliminated the deficit and finished the year with a 
net-asset balance of nearly $412,000,
141
 which subsequently grew to over $870,000 the 
following year.
142
 In 2008, the orchestra’s net asset balance began to decline, shrinking to 
approximately $734,000
143
 and plummeting to -$1.3 million in 2009.
144
 In 2010, the 
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organization reduced its deficit to -$255,000
145
 through making “significant changes to its 
operating plan,” including postponing projects and reducing artistic and administrative 
salaries.
146
 In 2011, the organization successfully achieved a positive net-asset balance of 
approximately $103,000.
147
 During 2007–2011, the symphony experienced certain 
amounts of operating deficits. In 2007 and 2008, the symphony experienced operating 
deficits of approximately -$143,000 and -$190,000. In 2009, the operating deficit 
plummeted to approximately -$2.5 million. However, through the implementation of a 
deficit reduction plan (set to take three years), the symphony successfully reduced its 
operating deficit to -$413,000 by 2011.
148
  
Findings 
 To interpret the findings, I used the theoretical frameworks of dynamic 
capabilities
149
 and a “resource-based” view.
150
 After analyzing the culled data, I propose 
that while state government funding was a critical source of funding for the North 
Carolina Symphony, the government funding did not lie at the core of the orchestra’s 
fiscal sustainability. Rather, the orchestra’s fiscal sustainability was primarily derived 
from community engagement, fostered by the North Carolina Symphony’s clarity of 
mission that translated into community-oriented program activities. Community 
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engagement was further fueled by the secondary fiscal sustainability strategies of 
transparency, leveraging human resources, and a service mindset. 
 
 
                                                                         
Figure 4.1. Fiscal Sustainability Strategies of the North Carolina Symphony. 
 
A Clear Mission that Translates into Community-Oriented Program Activities 
 Nonprofit literature firmly establishes the importance of a clear and focused 
mission statement for long-term financial viability. As Lisa Sontag-Padilla et al. (2012) 
point out, a clear mission “focus[es] the organization’s activities and help[s] to motivate 
and direct innovation (and in turn, promote sustainability) in the long term.”
151
 Likewise, 
Jim Collins (2005) argues that mission and financial sustainability (what he terms as an 
organization’s “resource engine”) are inextricably linked. He explains, “You must be able 
to answer the question, ‘How does focusing on what we do best [i.e., mission] tie directly 
into our resource engine, and how does our resource engine reinforce what we can do 
best?’”
152
 Ironically, while fiscal sustainability literature for nonprofit organizations as a 
whole stresses the importance of a clear mission, American orchestra fiscal sustainability 
literature does not appear to highlight the importance of mission. Perhaps this is due to a 
general assumption that an orchestra’s mission is intrinsically predefined as performing 
orchestral repertoire. However, this premise may not be as clear-cut as it appears. 
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Fundamentally, an orchestra’s mission should specifically answer: why does an orchestra 
perform orchestral repertoire, and for whom? What type of orchestral music does it 
perform, and where?  
The North Carolina Symphony has a clear and specific dual mission to deliver 
music education and statewide service. This two-pronged mission translates into two 
broad community-oriented program categories that are directly linked with the 
orchestra’s long-term fiscal sustainability: 
- Music education concerts for North Carolina school children 
- Orchestra concerts that take place in a plethora of communities throughout the 
state of North Carolina 
Due to the fact that every organization has a finite amount of financial resources, 
nonprofit literature recommends “areas of expertise” as a strategy to combat resource 
scarcity. Pablo (et al.) presents dynamic capabilities as a strategy that “allow[s] 
organizations to use internal resources strategically and advantageously . . . to maximize 
organizational performance.”
153
 Kotler and Scheff advise organizations to focus on their 
identified “core competencies” as a basis for their program emphases.
154
 Jim Collins 
recommends employing what he terms as a “best at,” which he defines as “understanding 
what your organization can uniquely contribute to the people it touches, better than any 
organization on the planet.”
155
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Based on the language in the North Carolina Symphony’s executive summaries, 
the organization clearly views education and statewide service as its “area of expertise” 
and unique contribution to the community it serves. As all of its executive summaries 
from 2005 through 2010 state, the North Carolina Symphony “is [one of the] largest 
orchestras in the country, but it is singularly unique in two respects: 1) its commitment to 
statewide service 2) its dedication to the musical education of North Carolina’s school 
children” [emphasis added].
156
 Several of the executive summaries add, “No other 
orchestra in America serves its state to the extent of the North Carolina Symphony does, 
as the orchestra performs far more educational performances outside of its home-base 
community than any other orchestra.”
157
 Its 2008 Executive Summary even asserts that 
the orchestra is “without peer in either respect” to statewide service and music 
education.
158
  
Thus, the North Carolina Symphony’s mission has an area of expertise designed to 
distinguish it from other American orchestras. Many symphony orchestras have some sort 
of education program, but often orchestra education programs seem to be afterthoughts of 
lesser importance than the orchestra’s artistic offerings, whereas the North Carolina’s 
symphony’s education program is a central part of its missions and an integral component 
of its program offerings to its constituents. As North Carolina Symphony resident 
conductor William Henry Curry explained in a media interview, “When I began here 18 
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years ago, I saw the education concerts as something we just did, but through the years 
I’ve seen them as perhaps the most important part of the mission.”
159
 Likewise, many 
orchestras have community concerts that take place outside of their home-base. However, 
the North Carolina Symphony performs over 55% of its concerts outside of the Triangle 
region, annually traveling 15,000 to 18,000 miles throughout the state to perform its 
concerts.
160
   
Music education and statewide service translate into economic drivers for the 
symphony. Since its first education concert in 1940s, the orchestra has performed for 
over 5 million North Carolina school children. In addition to introducing the school 
children to general musical concepts such as melody and texture,
161
 the education 
concerts allow the children to “interact with the orchestra and experience the thrill of 
hearing [live music].”
162
 Ultimately, as Senior Director of Statewide Development Rob 
Maddrey explained in a 2010 media interview, “we are hoping we will inspire a love of 
music for years to come just by this one simple introduction.” Studies have indicated that 
arts education is strongly correlated with adult arts event attendance,
163
 and some have 
concluded that exposure to arts education is the strongest predictor of arts 
consumption.
164
 In this way, the music education concerts can be viewed as a long-term 
investment in the symphony’s audience base.
165
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There is also anecdotal evidence that suggests the North Carolina Symphony 
education concerts have an impact that many of students remember in adulthood. As 
Swalin wrote in Hard-Circus Road, “Even today, in communities across the state, 
someone will occasionally stop me on the street and exclaim, ‘I know you! I was in’–he 
or she will specify the grade and school–‘I heard the North Carolina Symphony!’ Music 
has moral potentialities; for through it, a student can grow from the small to the large in 
terms of quality of existence, character, and nobility of soul.”
166
 Resident conductor 
William Curry concurred in a media interview, “Everywhere we go, people come up to 
me and say thank you for that experience thirty or forty years ago, when the symphony 
visited their small town.”
167
  
In addition to educating school children about the symphonic genre, the school 
concerts are intended to ignite an interest and passion for classical music within the 
children. When the children grow up, some of them become audience members and 
donors, Kotler and Scheff cite the importance of a long-term view of marketing that 
focuses on attracting young audience members in order to “build a strong foundation for 
[the organization’s] future for a time when the younger people will have more leisure 
time and more discretionary income to pay higher ticket prices and make substantial 
contributions.”
168
 A small portion of the children at the North Carolina Symphony 
education concerts even become future arts leaders. Some of the North Carolina 
Symphony’s board members are native North Carolinians and heard the orchestra 
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perform for the first time when they were schoolchildren. These board members cite the 
concerts as a pivotal experience in their lives that ignited their love for the North Carolina 
Symphony specifically as well as the genre of classical orchestral music as a whole.
169
 
Thus, the education concerts also have the potential to grow future leaders of the 
symphony. 
The education concerts also help to secure private grant funding from sources 
that, like the orchestra, exist to serve the people of North Carolina. For instance, the 
symphony secured a new $10,000 grant for its educational programs from the A.J. 
Fletcher Foundation, an organization with a mission “to support nonprofit organizations 
in their endeavors to enrich the lives and well-being of people in North Carolina.”
170
 In a 
press release Fletcher Foundation Executive Director Damon Circosta explained that 
“music has the power to reach and teach children in a unique and powerful way. For 
decades, the North Carolina Symphony’s Education Programs have proven this through 
their exceptional outreach and we are proud to extend our support to continue their 
programming throughout the state.”
171
 Thus, because the foundation and the symphony 
serve the same constituents, they are natural financial allies. 
The orchestra’s statewide service and philosophy of “bringing the music to the 
people” also has many immediate benefits that contribute to the organization’s fiscal 
sustainability. Touring allows the symphony to reach a wider audience and potential 
donor base, increasing their earned and contributed revenue. As indicated by the research 
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of orchestra scholar Arthur C. Brooks, orchestras with budgets of over $5 million are 
more likely to reap long-term financial gains if they concentrate on “expanding [their] 
audience/patron base with previously uninitiated consumers” (i.e., first-time concert-
goers) rather than if they “promote the elite image of orchestra products.”
172
 
Community Engagement as a Fiscal Sustainability Strategy 
As evidenced by Strategy 2017, the North Carolina Symphony’s strategic plan for 
the years 2013–2017, the orchestra has intentionally leveraged community engagement as 
a fiscal sustainability strategy. While Strategy 2017 was not the strategic plan for the case 
study’s time period, it was crafted immediately after the time period. As a result, an 
examination of the plan can shed light on the beliefs, values, and organizational culture of 
the North Carolina Symphony from 2005–2011. 
Strategy 2017 articulates three goals: Artistic Excellence, Community 
Engagement, and Fiscal Sustainability. As visually represented in Figure 2, each goal is 
linked to the other goals: artistic excellence leads to an engaged community; an engaged 
community leads to financial sustainability, and financial sustainability leads back to 
artistic excellence.  
The diagram depicts a positive cycle: the symphony produces an excellent 
product (musical and education concerts) desired by the community. In response, the 
community members support the product through buying tickets to concerts and 
providing individual donations, and foundations and government groups also invest funds 
in the product. Essentially, the community “buys” a product supplied by the symphony. 
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This buy-in leads to fiscal sustainability, which then produces the financial resources 
necessary to continue supplying the market with the desired product of high quality 
music and education concerts.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Diagram Excerpted from Strategy 2017
173
 
 
Most importantly, the goals and strategies outlined in Strategy 2017 demonstrate 
that the symphony views community engagement as an economic driver. Notably, each 
of the three goals in the strategic plan (Excellence, Community, and Fiscal Sustainability) 
refer to the North Carolina community in their descriptions or underlying strategies. The 
strategic plan’s second goal, Community, defines the role the symphony desires to have 
in its community, which is “to effect positive change [in our community] through the 
advancement of orchestral music.” The first and third goals, Excellence and Fiscal 
Sustainability, also indirectly reference community. Under Excellence, Strategy 2017 
states that the symphony intends to be “identified as the first orchestra experience by the 
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citizens of North Carolina” [emphasis added]. Thus, the symphony wishes to have a 
prominent place in the experiences of the people of North Carolina. Additionally, of the 
four cited strategies to achieve Excellence, two reference people: one strategy is to 
improve patron/customer service, and another strategy is to deliver top-quality music 
education programs to school children. Under Sustainability, four of the strategies 
naturally reference financial health, but the final cited strategy is for the symphony to 
“deepen its relationship with the North Carolina community.” As a result, community 
engagement is integrated into every goal of Strategy 2017.
174
  
Based on Strategy 2017, it is apparent that the symphony views community 
engagement as an essential component of its fiscal sustainability. This concept is also 
supported by nonprofit literature. Collins promotes “brand” as a crucial component of an 
organization’s resource engine, and he defines “brand” as “how well your organization 
can cultivate a deep well of emotional goodwill and mindshare of its potential 
supporters.”
175
 Thus, while a great mission and product are essential components for a 
fiscally sustainable organization, they are not enough without a deep connection to and 
support of the product. In the instance of the North Carolina Symphony, its statewide 
service and music education concerts foster relational community engagement with the 
people of North Carolina. Kotler and Scheff also cite the importance of community 
engagement as a method to integrate the arts into “our everyday lives,” which will in turn 
enable arts organizations to attract more people to their product and build audiences.
176
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Transparency 
The North Carolina Symphony’s community engagement also manifests through 
the organization’s transparency and accountability. For instance, in the organization’s 
IRS tax form-990s from 2005–2010, the orchestra voluntarily included detailed executive 
summaries as supplemental documentation. In 2011, the orchestra shifted to an annual 
“Report to the Community” format, which it voluntarily attached to its 2011 IRS tax-
form 990 (at the time of this writing, the symphony continues to publish an annual Report 
to the Community, all of which are easily accessible on its website).
177
 As RAND 
researchers explain, transparency is a key element to fiscal sustainability because 
“foundations and other donors increasingly want access to up-to-date information about 
an organization’s operations and finances.”
178
 The researchers point to annual reports as a 
key method of providing stakeholders pertinent financial information such financial 
numbers as well as “soft data” such as mission success and program achievement,
179
 
citing it as “the most relevant information a nonprofit can provide to its stakeholders…. 
For donors and funders, what an organization does (its mission) is the most important 
motivating factor when it comes to giving.”
180
   
Leveraging Human Resources 
 To deepen its community engagement, the symphony also leverages its human 
resources of administrative and artistic leadership, board members, and volunteers. In 
2010, the orchestra hired Sandi MacDonald as its new president and CEO (Ms. 
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MacDonald previously worked for The Cleveland Orchestra). Within the first six months 
of her appointment, Ms. MacDonald made an enormous effort to visit as many of North 
Carolina’s towns as possible in order to become acquainted with the communities. As 
state secretary of cultural resources Linda Carlisle remarked, “She is working to make 
connections with the citizens. She is very focused on high-quality programming, but she 
is also looking at how to extend the reach of the symphony, [including to the non-metro 
areas of the state].”
181
  
The North Carolina Symphony also invests in artistic leadership that can connect 
with audiences. In a 2013 press release announcing the renewal of North Carolina 
Symphony music director Grant Llewellyn’s contract, orchestra administration 
emphasized the conductor’s ability to connect with the people of North Carolina. As 
Symphony Society Board Chair Jeff Corbett explained, “Through Grant’s amazing ability 
to connect with people, young and old, and in every walk of life, he has helped to take 
this cultural treasure of our state and make it a real part of our communities.” Likewise, 
North Carolina Symphony bassist Bruce Ridge echoed, “The musicians of the orchestra 
and Maestro Llewellyn have formed a unique bond, built in friendship… and a deep 
belief in the mission of the North Carolina Symphony to bring great music to all the 
people of North Carolina.”
182
  
Thus, the North Carolina Symphony actively seeks artistic and administrative 
leaders that are committed to investing in and connecting with the North Carolina 
community. Dynamic administrative and artistic leadership contributes to fiscal 
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sustainability, because a leadership team engaged with the community is better able to 
recruit donors and attract audiences. As symphony bassist Bruce Ridge noted, “The 
extension of [music director Grant Llewellyn’s contract will lead to . . . organizational 
growth through our service to our loyal audiences in the Triangle and throughout the 
state.”
183
 
The North Carolina Symphony also invests in and leverages its board members. 
The North Carolina Symphony’s board is comprised of a select number of government 
officials and governor appointees as well as members from a variety of communities. For 
in instance, the orchestra’s 2011 board primarily consisted of Raleigh residents, but it 
also consisted of residents of other towns across the state including Greensboro, 
Fayetteville, Pinehurst, Hendersonville, and New Bern.
184
 As noted by Rand Corporation 
researchers, a key factor in nonprofit fiscal sustainability is leadership from a community 
board that consists of political leaders and variety of individual with differing 
occupations from various communities.
185
 In addition to fiduciary duties, board members 
must approve program goals and oversee the strategic direction of the orchestra to ensure 
that it achieves its mission. In order to accomplish this, trustees must fully understand the 
mission and the purpose of the symphony. As then-North Carolina Symphony Vice 
President for Patron Service Michael Guillot explained in an interview with Philanthropy 
Journal, “Most [organizations] probably don’t do a good job at all training trustees in 
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how to do their jobs and then supporting them. It’s about honoring the role trustees can 
play and giving them the support they need. We need that at all times.”
186 
Leveraging its people is a crucial component to the link between an orchestra’s 
fiscal sustainability and community engagement. In a Harmony magazine article, Paul R. 
Judy states, “The performance, advancement, and preservation of classical symphonic 
music in America depends on a broad and growing audience base and the existence of 
many healthy symphony orchestra organizations providing orchestral performances 
accessible to many communities. To ensure this scenario, we need to be concerned about 
the human makeup of these organizations. . . . We need to be concerned about the 
effectiveness and value they are providing to the communities they serve.” [emphasis 
added].
187
 The North Carolina Symphony leverages its leaders to engage with its 
community: its administrative and artistic leaders travel all over the state to connect with 
the people of North Carolina, and it invests in its board members and recruits them from 
a variety of North Carolina communities. It also provides its musicians with opportunities 
to interact with audience members. Thus, the North Carolina symphony relationally 
engages its community, leveraging its leaders, musicians, and volunteers as the face of its 
community engagement.  
The community engagement of the North Carolina Symphony is a two-way, 
interactive relationship between the organization and its community: the people of the 
North Carolina Symphony connect with the North Carolina community and draw them 
into their product. As the North Carolina Symphony website explains, “the staff, at its 
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essence, is charged with drawing patrons as close to the music and organization as 
possible.”
188
 The symphony harnesses its people as a valuable commodity and also uses 
them to draw in and connect with the audience members. Notably, the North Carolina 
Symphony does not seem to expect community members to be inherently attracted to its 
product, nor to come flocking to its product. Instead, it charges its people with the task of 
relationally drawing in the people of the state. 
As previously noted, the North Carolina Symphony also cultivates a large 
volunteer base comprised of community members: over 418 volunteers that log over 
16,400 hours per year in approximately a dozen volunteer chapters across the state. The 
organization also has easily accessible information through its website about how 
community citizens can get involved. On its webpage “Contribute: How You Can Help,” 
the orchestra describes different methods through which audience members can 
contribute monetarily to the organization, but it concludes the list with “Volunteer Your 
Time.” As it explains, “Your North Carolina Symphony depends on contributions of time 
and talent to continue our mission of statewide service and music education.” On the 
Volunteer page, the organization explains that in addition to assisting with operational 
needs, volunteers serve as ambassadors between the symphony and North Carolina 
community, thus strengthening the relationship and bridging the gap between the two 
entities. The Volunteer page also points out through time contributions, volunteers “have 
fun” and “get to know” symphony staff and musicians—essentially, the volunteer 
program allows the orchestra to interact directly with community members, and as a 
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result, the volunteers become a part of the North Carolina Symphony community.
189
 
Thus, the organization connects relationally its volunteers.  
A healthy volunteer base is a key strategy in fiscal sustainability. As Sontag-
Padilla points out, “volunteers can complement existing staff, offer expertise that 
nonprofits may not have readily accessible, and enhance productivity and program 
delivery.” They are also an essential resource in times of economic downturn,
190
 when 
revenue and staff resources are low. As the symphony’s Society Chair, Catharine 
Arrowood pointed out in an interview, “Running an orchestra is a complex thing. Being 
able to draw on a deep pool of passionate and knowledgeable volunteers has been crucial 
to building a sustainable organization.”
191
 A large volunteer base cuts administration 
costs, and volunteers serve as advocates for the symphony, attracting audiences and 
recruiting donors. Volunteers also have the potential to turn into donors. A healthy 
volunteer base can also be a factor that leads to foundation and government funding–a 
large volunteer base demonstrates community ownership, an element that funders often 
taken into consideration before committing their support. A healthy volunteer base also 
ties into the “time” component within Collins’ resource engine, which “refers to how well 
you attract people willing to contribute their efforts for free.”
192
 
A Service Mentality 
Notably, the symphony also appears to have organizationally adopted a mentality 
of service. One crucial facet of its mission is to provide statewide service to North 
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Carolina, which it accomplishes through “bringing the music to the people” of North 
Carolina, wherever they are. This language choice demonstrates a sense of humility: 
rather than existing to “enlighten” or “bestow musical wisdom” upon its audience 
members (i.e., an “elitist, product-centered viewpoint”
193
), the symphony’s mission 
statement indicates that it exists to help them through musical service. Additionally, 
rather than expecting the audience members to join the orchestra in its Raleigh concert 
hall, the symphony tours the state and brings its music to the North Carolinians in their 
home communities. Both nonprofit and for-profit literature suggests that a “servant-
leader” mentality positively impacts financial performance. Collins argues that 
sustainable organizations have what he terms as “Level 5 leaders”–that is, leaders with a 
“compelling combination of personal humility and professional will” [emphasis 
added].
194
 Likewise, Popeye’s Louisiana Kitchen CEO Cheryl Bachelder credits the 
company’s adoption of a servant-leader mentality as the cause of its recent financial 
turnaround.
195
 In Standing Room Only, Kotler and Scheff argue for an audience-centric 
marketing strategy that focuses on the concerns and needs of the target audience.
196 
Government Funding 
Without question, the North Carolina state government has played a significant 
role in the symphony’s long-term fiscal sustainability. As mentioned previously, the 
North Carolina Symphony has had a historical reliance on the state government, 
stemming back to the recurring subsidy it has received from the state since the 1940s, and 
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during the case study’s time period, the North Carolina DCR funding comprised a 
significant portion of the symphony’s annual revenue at 20% to over 34% of its annual 
revenue, an extremely high ratio for the American field (in recent decades, government 
funds have comprised less than 5% of the field’s total revenue). Historically and within 
the studied time period, the state subsidy has also provided benefits beyond the 
immediate financial gains. The symphony’s “officially recognized importance” [italics 
original] provided the symphony with credibility in the community,
197
 and bills passed in 
the 1950s allowed the symphony to receive tax-free donations and gave small, rural 
communities incentives to buy subscriptions to North Carolina Symphony concerts,
198
 
helping to stimulate private support from the North Carolina community. The 
symphony’s close relationship with the state also spurred state legislators to advocate for 
the symphony and encourage the North Carolina community to develop an interest in the 
symphony’s artistic product.
199
  
Although government funding is part of the North Carolina Symphony’s current 
and historical legacy, an intimate relationship with the state government is not necessarily 
ideal. As Pfeffer and Salancik point out, a reliance on government funds can lead to 
resource dependency in which “the demands for certainty” limit an organization’s 
autonomy and control over its activities.
200
 While the government funds do not directly 
pay for the North Carolina Symphony’s educational and outreach concerts, the theory of 
resource dependence suggests that the stability brought by the recurring government 
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subsidies have the potential to influence the symphony’s internal decisions about the 
centrality and role of the programs within the organization. Notably, the North Carolina 
Symphony crafted its organizational identity as a touring, community-oriented orchestra 
for the state of North Carolina in the 1930s and before it attained recurring government 
subsidies in the 1940s. However, viewed through the framework of resource dependency, 
it is possible the prospect of government subsidy influenced the symphony to mold its 
organizational identity to encourage higher levels of government support.  
An additional difficulty is the fact that the symphony’s expenses appear to rise 
faster than the government funding. For instance, the orchestra had a $2.37 million 
annual budget in 1983 and received $1.65 million in government subsidy. As such, state 
support comprised 70% of the orchestra’s total revenue $2.37 million budget.
201
 
However, as denoted in Table 4.4, the orchestra’s budget ranged from $9.7 million to 
$10.5 million from 2005 through 2011 while the recurring government subsidy ranged 
from $2.6 million to $2.86 million (note: because Table 4.4 denotes recurring grant-in-aid 
from the North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, the 2010 $1.5 million grant 
challenge was excluded from calculation). Thus, over a thirty-year time period, the 
orchestra’s expenses increased by a factor of approximately five while the recurring 
government subsidy increased by less than a factor of two. 
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Table 4.4 
The North Carolina Symphony’s NC DCR Funding and Annual Expenses, 2005–2011 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NC DCR 
Funding 
$2.6 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.8 
million 
$2.86 
million 
$2.65 
million 
Not 
Available 
Total 
Expenses 
$9.7 
million 
$9.5 
million 
$9.8 
million 
$10.4 
million 
$10.5 
million 
$9.8 
million 
$9.9 
million 
 
It also seems that the government is willing to conditionally invest in the 
orchestra because the orchestra demonstrates that it provides value to the community. For 
instance, the $1.5 million “grant challenges” significantly bolstered the symphony’s state 
funding in 2010 and 2011. However, the grant challenges were contingent on the 
orchestra’s abilities to raise specified levels of private support.
202
 Essentially, the North 
Carolina government required the orchestra to demonstrate that it had the support of and 
investment from the community before the state was willing to invest additional funds in 
the symphony. Additionally, while the music education concerts and the concerts 
throughout the state were not directly “purchased” or “required” by the government, they 
did provide incentive for the government to support the symphony, because the North 
Carolina Symphony and the North Carolina DCR have a common purpose to make the 
arts (in this case, orchestral music) available to every North Carolina Citizen. 
Reciprocally, the North Carolina Symphony does not seem to view government 
support as one of its primary fiscal sustainability strategies. Strategy 2017, its most recent 
strategic plan, did not mention increasing government revenue or strengthening 
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government relations as one of its initiatives. Instead, it focused on strengthening its 
relationship with the North Carolina community. Additionally, one of its executive 
summaries from the studied time period stated, “DCR funding represented 27% of the 
symphony total expenses [this fiscal year]. 73% of symphony expenses are funded by 
private revenue” [emphasis in original].
203
 Through the use of the bold font, the 
symphony drew emphasis to its private funding levels. Ironically, its level of private 
funding is quite low for the field while its level of government support is extremely high 
for the field. However, the symphony overview intentionally chose to draw attention 
away from the unusual fact of high government funding levels and instead emphasized 
private support. Thus, the symphony demonstrated the value it placed on support from 
the community. Likewise, every symphony Executive Overview from 2005 through 2010 
emphatically stated that the orchestra was “singularly unique” from other American 
orchestras due to its high levels of statewide service and music education. The symphony 
could have easily stated that it was “singularly unique” due to its high levels of 
government funding, but instead chose to draw attention to the importance of its mission. 
Perhaps most revealing is the “State of the Symphony” in the North Carolina 
Symphony’s 2011 Report to the Community. The section acknowledged government 
support as an essential component of its ability to reduce its $2.5 million operational 
deficit, but it concluded with the following statement: “the North Carolina Symphony’s 
statewide commitment is essential. And, in these times of fiscal restraint, our 
commitment has not diminished. In fact, our diminished resources have caused us to 
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focus squarely on our mission statement . . . We feel confident that with your continued 
support and our prudent financial management, the Symphony will be able to eliminate 
its cumulative deficit in the foreseeable future” [emphasis added].
204
 Thus, while the 
North Carolina Symphony acknowledged the government’s role in its fiscal 
sustainability, it viewed its mission statement and community engagement as the key 
factors that would continue to ground its fiscal sustainability.  
Conclusion 
 Through a qualitative single-case study approach, Chapter IV examined the role 
of government funding in the North Carolina Symphony’s financial stability and 
investigated other factors that contributed to its fiscal sustainability from 2005 through 
2011. I applied Robert K. Yin’s essential components for collecting data as follows:  
1. Research Questions: What factors contributed to the North Carolina 
Symphony’s fiscal consistency from 2005 to 2011, and what were its fiscal 
sustainability strategies?  
2. Proposition: Government funding played a prominent role in the orchestra’s 
fiscal stability and fiscal sustainability strategies. 
3. Unit of Analysis: The North Carolina Symphony, with a specific time 
boundary of 2005–2011.
205
  
In the data collection for the unit of analysis, sources of evidence include documentation 
and archival records such as tax form-990s, annual executive and community reports, and 
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media articles. To interpret the findings, I employed the theoretical frameworks of 
dynamic capabilities and resource dependency.  
After analyzing the culled data, I concluded that while state government funding 
is a critical source of funding for the North Carolina Symphony, government funding 
does not lie at the core of the orchestra’s fiscal sustainability. Historically as well as 
within the studied time period, the orchestra’s expenses rose at a faster rate than the state 
government funding, and as a result, the orchestra was required to find other revenues to 
fill its income gap. Additionally, in the orchestra’s documents (i.e., executive summaries, 
community report, and strategic plan), state government funding was never cited as a 
fiscal sustainability strategy.  
While government funding was a crucial income source for the North Carolina 
Symphony, the orchestra’s primary fiscal sustainability strategy can be summarized as 
community engagement, which was derived from the organization’s clarity of mission 
that translated into community-oriented program activities. As evidenced by the 
symphony’s executive summaries, the North Carolina Symphony viewed its dual mission 
of statewide service and music education as its area of expertise and the defining feature 
that distinguished it from other orchestras. Additionally, as evidenced by its 2011 Report 
to the Community and Strategy 2017, the North Carolina Symphony viewed mission 
focus and community engagement as drivers for its fiscal sustainability strategy. The 
orchestra’s mission directly translated into two community-oriented program activities, 
music education and community concerts throughout the state of North Carolina, which 
served as economic drivers for the orchestra. To deepen its community engagement, the 
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symphony also utilized practices of transparency, leveraging people (symphony 
administration, artistic leaders, board members, and volunteers), and service mindset, 
each of which served as secondary fiscal sustainability strategies. 
Future research might include additional case studies on fiscal sustainability 
strategies of large American orchestras, including the other four orchestras identified as 
fiscally consistent from 2005 through 2011. Future research might also examine the role 
of clear mission statements and community engagement as economic drivers in large 
American orchestras. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter V presents implications for practitioners derived from the single-case 
study of the North Carolina Symphony presented in Chapter IV. As mentioned 
previously, there is a dearth of scholarly sources that provide concrete fiscal 
sustainability strategies for orchestra managers. This paper offers its contribution to the 
literature through the suggestions presented in this chapter. 
 Chapter V is organized by the following sections: 
- A Clear Mission that Fosters Relational Community Engagement 
- The Importance of a Music Education Program 
- The Role of Government Funding 
A Clear Mission that Fosters Relational Community Engagement 
 The North Carolina Symphony can be characterized as employing dynamic 
capabilities in order to maximize its financial performance.
206
 Its primary fiscal 
sustainability strategy can be summarized as having and executing a clear mission that 
translates into clear program activities that foster relational community engagement. 
Based on the findings Chapter IV’s case study as well as nonprofit literature, orchestra 
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leaders are encouraged to closely scrutinize their orchestra’s mission statement. The 
mission statement should clearly and specifically articulate the following: 
˗ What the organization does (i.e., program activities) 
˗ Why it does what it does (i.e., justification for existence) 
˗ For whom (i.e., the population it serves) 
The mission should also identify what separates and distinguishes it from other large  
American orchestras (i.e., its area of expertise). In the case of the North Carolina 
Symphony, it intends to provide statewide service and music education on a deeper level 
than any other orchestra in America. Other orchestras can follow its example by 
identifying what they can do better than every other orchestra in America. The most 
literal translation of this is for an orchestra to deepen its relationship with its own state–
because most states have just one or two large orchestras, there is less inherent 
competition in this program model.  
However, an orchestra’s area of expertise is by no means limited to statewide 
service. For instance, The Cleveland Orchestra avouches that its core competency is 
artistic excellence. In Good to Great and the Social Sectors, Collins cites the orchestra’s 
profoundly moving performance of Mahler’s Symphony No. 5 two days after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. Although there was initially debate regarding whether or 
not the performance would be appropriate, the orchestra’s executive and music directors 
concluded that “perhaps more than any other week in history, people needed the orchestra 
to do the one thing that it does supremely well: play the most powerful music ever 
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created by the human race.”
207
 After the concert, the orchestra’s executive director 
asserted, “There is absolutely nothing we could have done to be of better service at the 
moment than to stick with what we do best, standing firm behind our core values of great 
music with uncompromising artistic excellence.” In his own commentary of the event, 
Collins writes, “It didn’t matter that some patrons might want a rousing sing-along…or 
that the media might criticize. What mattered is that the orchestra remained true to its 
core values and Hedgehog concept, doing for the people of Cleveland only what it could 
do better than any other organization in the world.” [emphasis in original].
208
 
 Of course, it is not necessarily an easy task for an orchestra to pinpoint what it 
does better than every other orchestra. Notably, the organization must have the potential 
to be the best in the area that it identifies. As Collins cautions, an organization cannot 
simply have a “goal to be the best, a strategy to be the best, an intention to be the best, a 
place to be the best. It [must have] an understanding of what it can be the best at. The 
distinction is absolutely crucial” [italics original].
209
 For this reason, it is probably not 
reasonable for the majority of large American orchestras to identify artistic excellence as 
their defining characteristic. An orchestra can (and likely should) aim to raise its artistic 
level, but it would probably be more feasible for it to choose some other arena that it can 
excel in beyond that of other American orchestras. Potential areas might include: 
- Performing music from a particular era or specific geographic area 
- Innovative programming 
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- Multimedia concert experiences 
- Community and audience engagement activities 
Regardless of what an orchestra chooses as its core competency, the area should be one 
that the orchestra is deeply passionate about
210
 and capable of achieving.
211
 
 After identifying its defining characteristic that separates it from other American 
orchestras, an orchestra should ascertain how to link its resource engine to its area of 
expertise.
212
 In the case of the North Carolina Symphony, its mission translated into two 
broad categories of program activities that fostered relational community engagement. 
The symphony’s legacy of annually playing for 50,000–100,000 school children each 
season steadily grew its future audience members, donors, and arts leaders; likewise, the 
adult concerts throughout the state widened the symphony’s donor and audience base. As 
evidenced in Chapter IV, the cultivation of donors, audience members, and arts leaders 
translated into economic drivers for the orchestra. In this way, the North Carolina 
Symphony linked its resource engine to its core competencies.  
Other large American orchestras can link their resource engines to their area of 
expertise in a variety of ways. However, it should be noted that the research of Arthur C. 
Brooks indicates that large orchestras (i.e., orchestras with annual budgets over $5 
million) have better success with fiscal sustainability if they focus on expanding their 
audience and patron base with “previously uninitiated consumers,” versus promoting “the 
elite image of orchestra products,” which his research indicated as being more beneficial 
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for orchestras with budgets under $5 million.
213
 In light of this research, the leaders of 
large American orchestras may want to consider crafting a resource engine that 
concentrates on concert experiences that are likely to bring in large numbers of 
previously uninitiated concertgoers, such as community concerts or innovative concert 
experiences.  
Notably, the North Carolina Symphony’s linkage between its area of expertise 
and its resource engine did not happen overnight. Instead, a long and careful cultivation 
of its core competency resulted in an economic driver after the course of several decades. 
For example, 50,000 school children hear the symphony, many for the first time, every 
year. However, the children will not be potential donors, arts leaders, or paying audience 
members until several years after the initial event. As such, this particular facet of the 
symphony’s community engagement is a long-term investment. As a result, as other 
orchestras evolve how they can create and link a resource engine to their area of 
expertise, they should be aware that the linkage and economic drivers will likely not 
happen overnight.  
 As orchestra leaders craft their resource engines, they should also focus on 
leveraging their people (symphony administration, artistic leaders, board members, and 
volunteers) to advance their organizational mission as well as serve as economic drivers. 
Following the example set by the North Carolina Symphony, other orchestras can invest 
in artistic and administrative leaders willing to forge relational connections with their 
orchestras’ communities and people groups. Likewise, orchestras should cultivate a large 
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system of community volunteers.
214
 The North Carolina Symphony has a unique and 
extensive volunteer system of hubs and auxiliary chapters that extends throughout the 
entire state. If an orchestra serves more than one city or geographic region, it can emulate 
the North Carolina Symphony’s model by establishing volunteer chapters in each city or 
geographic area outside of its “home” base. Additionally, orchestras should cultivate an 
engaged and involved board of directors that is rich in occupational diversity.
215
 In 
addition to providing the organization with a wealth of expertise, nonprofit research 
indicates that involved community board members lead to “a sense of ownership” 
positively correlated with fiscal sustainability.
216
  
 As orchestras execute their mission through program activities, they are highly 
encouraged to emulate the North Carolina Symphony’s practice of transparency through 
published Executives Summaries and easily accessible Reports to the Community, which 
nonprofit literature indicates as being linked to fiscal sustainability. The documents can 
detail annual financial summaries, but they should also detail nonfinancial performance 
details, such as program activities, objectives, evaluations, success stories, and 
information that is “relevant to any decision to support a nonprofit through donations and 
volunteering.”
217
 
Music Education and Service 
  While many American symphony orchestras have a music education program and 
a community outreach program, the North Carolina Symphony encompasses these 
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programs as core tenants of its mission. As stated in the previous section, the broadest 
practical implication that can be gleaned from these practices is for an orchestra to have a 
clear, focused mission that distinguishes it from other American orchestras as well as 
engages its community. However, orchestras might also choose to apply a more specific 
implication derived from the case study by reconsidering the relative importance of their 
music education and community engagement programs. Results in a study by Paul 
DiMaggio and Toqir Mukhtar suggested that cultural arts participation declined in the 
United States from 1982 to 2002. Researchers concluded, “We suspect that if [arts] 
attendance continues to decline, at some point such art forms will become irrelevant to 
the shared culture of families and social groups whose life chances are most dependent 
upon their command of cultural capital.”
218
 Kotler and Sheff suggest that community 
outreach efforts have the potential to increase arts attendance, arguing that “such efforts 
will weave the arts into the very fabric of our community. Each of these activities will 
create new opportunities for exposing people to art and showing them how art is integral 
to our everyday lives…which in turn will make the artistic experience compelling to a 
broader number of people.”
219
  
In a 2012 article for the Huffington Post, Tony Woodcock pointed to the orchestra 
financial crises of the previous decade and advocated that it called for a reinvention of the 
field’s “interface” with the community. Woodcock posed the question: “Could we 
redirect the orchestra from an almost-exclusive focus on performance to a multi-faceted 
education mission?” To accomplish this, Woodcock advocated for an “exponential 
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development” of American orchestras’ music education and community outreach 
programs that would take place outside of the traditional concert hall in easily accessibly 
community venues, such as parks and gymnasiums. Orchestral musicians would become 
“teaching artists” for school children, and orchestras would provide continuous free 
community concerts. He explained, “This would redefine in one bound the relationship of 
an orchestra to its community, by actually beginning to address the needs of that 
community.”
 220
 Woodcock’s article did not cite any empirical evidence or specific 
orchestras to support his theories, but his underlying concept of the linkage between 
fiscal sustainability and music education and community engagement are blatantly 
manifested in the case study of the North Carolina Symphony.  
 In light of this, leaders and administrators of large orchestras without a heavy 
emphasis on community engagement and music education may wish to reevaluate the 
role of those programs within the organization. Notably, the Orchestra Forum’s Elephant 
Task Force challenged American orchestras to “see community engagement as [their] 
core mission” [emphasis added], posing the question: “What if an orchestra behaved as if 
it believed that artistic excellence and activities inside the traditional concert hall space 
were essential but incomplete parts of the community?”
221
 Like Woodcock, the Orchestra 
Forum did not have empirical evidence to support this theory. Rather, it had empirical 
evidence (supplied by Robert Flanagan) that action needed to be taken to address the 
financial challenges of American orchestras, and “community relationships” was one of 
several suggestions provided to address the issues. Regardless, the North Carolina 
                                                          
220
 Woodcock. 
221
 The Orchestra Forum, 4. 
84 
 
Symphony certainly manifested the Forum’s concept of having community engagement 
as the “core” of its mission and a large component of its fiscal sustainability strategy. 
 Large American orchestras can also emulate the North Carolina Symphony’s 
model by adopting a mindset of service. As noted in Chapter IV, research as well as the 
experience of practitioners has indicated a positive correlation between a servant-leader 
mentality and fiscal sustainability. Woodcock’s article and “The Elephant Taskforce” 
also emphasize the theoretical concept of service to the community. Woodcock argues 
that “in order not to [fail, orchestras] will need to listen to their communities and provide 
service that everyone recognizes as essential” [emphasis added].
222
 Likewise, the 
Elephant Task Force recommends that orchestras “be responsible first to the 
community—move from a delivery system to a service culture” [emphasis added].
223
 To 
apply a service mindset in the fashion of the North Carolina, orchestras can explore 
opportunities to “bring the music to the people” and serve their communities by 
delivering concerts in familiar (perhaps non-concert hall) venues throughout their 
communities.  
 Nonprofit literature heavily cautions against “mission drift.” As RAND’s 
nonprofit fiscal sustainability literature review explains, “it is essential to operations and 
sustainability to periodically revisit the mission and ensure that programs and services 
remain in line with the identity of the organization.”
224
 As a result, leaders of large 
orchestras without a heavy community engagement or music education emphasis may 
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fear that a large or sudden program expansion could lead to “mission drift.” If a leader’s 
orchestra is already financially stable, he or she is probably wise to question the necessity 
of a large organizational shift. However, if the leader’s orchestra is not financially stable 
(but has an annual budget of over $5 million), the organization may need to consider 
shifting to community-minded service model in order to remain financially viable.  
Government Funding 
 As previously noted, orchestra management scholars and practitioners tend to 
have strong opinions regarding government funding–they often regard it either as 
something to be feared and avoided at all costs, or as the solution that will resolve the 
income gap. However, these polar viewpoints carry inherent problems. As a whole, 
scholarly literature does not indicate that government funding is detrimental to an 
orchestra’s organizational and financial health. While economic theory implies that 
government support should “crowd out” private giving, research does not support this 
theory. Studies have indicated that government support can provide a neutral,
 225
 
modest
226
 or significant
227
 “crowd-in” effect for private giving. Additionally, while many 
orchestra practitioners have historically feared that heavy reliance on government funding 
will lead to “mission drift,” symphony researchers point out that the opposite can occur, 
that “by lessening the need for fundraising, [orchestras] can dedicate more of their time 
and resources to promoting the mission of the organization.”
228
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On the other end of the spectrum, the literature also does not indicate that 
government funding has the potential to be the final solution to resolve the financial 
difficulties of American symphony orchestras. Historically, the American government 
has never served in this capacity for the field as a whole. Although the level of 
government support for American orchestras has varied throughout the last century, 
government funding generally has not exceeded more than 10% of an American 
orchestra’s operating expenses,
229
 and as of 2011, government funding comprised less 
than 5% of the field’s revenue as a whole.
230
 It is also improbable that this level of giving 
will increase in the near future. As Flanagan notes in The Perilous Life of Symphony 
Orchestras, “in [this] era of large structural government deficits, long-term direct 
government support to orchestras seems unlikely in the United States.”
231
 As such, it 
seems unrealistic and inadvisable for American orchestras to attempt shift to a funding 
model relying heavily on government support. 
The case study of the North Carolina Symphony implies that orchestra leaders and 
managers can take a middle ground in regards to government funding: they can leverage 
government funding as part of a balanced revenue portfolio. Although the symphony 
displayed high levels of government funding for the orchestra field, the government 
funds were more or less evenly balanced with private giving and ticket sale revenue. 
While a revenue stream that comprises roughly a third of an orchestra’s operating budget 
certainly constitutes a critical source of funding, it is a far cry from “complete reliance on 
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the government.” Furthermore, research has indicated that revenue diversification is a 
viable financial strategy for American symphony orchestras.
232
 As such, orchestra 
managers and leaders can regard government funding as part of a revenue diversification 
strategy.  
As orchestra leaders seek to increase their organization’s level of government 
funding, it is recommended that they first seek to increase local and state funding before 
increasing federal funding. As demonstrated in 1987 and 2005 surveys of government 
funding distributions for American orchestras, federal funding decreased from 28% to 
15% of all government funding for the American orchestra field, while state support 
remained constant (40%) and local support increased from 32% to 45%.
233
 Furthermore, 
the case study revealed that the North Carolina Symphony and the North Carolina state 
government are natural allies because the two organizations serve the same people group. 
As other orchestras form natural alliances with government groups, they are more likely 
to find these allies at the local and state level rather than at the federal level. If an 
orchestra serves a city, it can seek to strengthen its relationship with city government 
agencies and ultimately seek higher levels of funding. Likewise, if an orchestra serves an 
entire county, it can seek to increase funding from the county government agencies. By 
strategically allying themselves with government agencies that serve their constituents, 
orchestras can decrease their chances of encountering “mission drift” and the 
phenomenon of “chasing the funding.”   
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Conclusion 
Based on the findings in Chapter IV, orchestras that seek to improve their fiscal 
sustainability are encouraged to create and execute a clear mission that fosters relational 
community engagement. Orchestra leaders should closely scrutinize their organization’s 
mission statement, making sure that it clearly and specifically articulates what the 
organization does (i.e., program activities), why it does what it does (i.e., justification for 
existence), and for whom (i.e., the population it serves). The mission should also identify 
what separates and distinguishes the organization from other large American orchestras 
and should subsequently be linked to its resource engine. As orchestra leaders craft their 
resource engines, they should also focus on leveraging their people (symphony 
administration, artistic leaders, board members, and volunteers) to advance their 
organizational mission as well as serve as economic drivers. Orchestras are also 
encouraged to publish an annual Executive Summary or Report to the community. 
Leaders of orchestras without a heavy emphasis on music education and community 
engagement are encouraged to reevaluate the role of those programs within their 
organization, and to consider adopting a “service” or servant leader mindset. 
Government funding can also be leveraged as a fiscal sustainability strategy, 
although it should not be regarded as a standalone solution. Instead, it should be 
considered as an essential component of a balanced revenue portfolio. Orchestra 
practitioners are advised to seek to increase government funding first at the local and 
state levels, allying themselves with government groups that their constituents to lower 
chances of incurring “mission drift.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Orchestra literature thoroughly documents that American symphony orchestras 
face inherent financial difficulties due to the phenomena of cost disease and the income 
gap, but as economist Douglas Dempster points out, “the key to understanding the 
economics of symphony orchestras . . . is not in understanding productivity lags. . . . The 
key is to understand how [financially successful symphony orchestras] control the 
perceived value of their service in order to keep pace with highly inflationary costs so as 
to sustain growth in earned income, as well as in public and private subsidies. How and 
why this is happening needs an explanation.”
234
 However, the “how and why” of 
successful orchestral fiscal sustainability practices are not thoroughly documented in 
academic orchestra literature. As such, this document intends to contribute to the 
literature by identifying concrete fiscal strategies that have been successfully employed 
by a large American symphony orchestra with the hope that other orchestra managers can 
incorporate the strategies into the practices of their organizations. 
In order to identify the large American orchestras that are fiscally consistent, I 
surveyed twenty-five orchestras with budgets of over $5 million, calculating each 
orchestra’s annual Total Income/Total Expense ratio over a seven-year period (2005–
2011). Of the twenty-five orchestras, five consistently achieved an income ratio of over 
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100%. In The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, Flanagan notes that “individual 
orchestras do not follow a common financial model,” meaning that while virtually every 
orchestra has the same revenue categories, the proportional makeup of each orchestra’s 
revenue package varies widely.
235
 This proved to be true in the resultant revenue ratios of 
the five top-performing financial orchestras of my study, each of which had extremely 
varied revenue packages.  
In order to identify the factors that contribute to an orchestra’s fiscal 
sustainability, I chose a qualitative single case-study approach. While any of the five 
identified orchestras might have been selected as a case-study subject, I selected the 
North Carolina Symphony because that it displayed an abnormally high level of 
government support. After analyzing the culled data, I concluded that while state 
government funding is a critical source of funding for the North Carolina Symphony, 
government funding does not lie at the core of the orchestra’s fiscal sustainability. 
Historically as well as within the studied time period, the orchestra’s expenses escalated 
at a faster rate than the state government funding, requiring the orchestra find other 
revenues to fill its income gap. State government funding was also never cited as a fiscal 
sustainability strategy in the organization’s internal documents. 
The North Carolina Symphony’s primary fiscal sustainability strategy can be 
summarized as community engagement derived from the organization’s clarity of mission 
that translated into community-oriented program activities. As evidenced by the 
symphony’s executive summaries, the North Carolina Symphony viewed its dual mission 
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of statewide service and music education as its area of expertise and the defining feature 
that distinguished it from other orchestras. Additionally, as evidenced by its 2011 Report 
to the Community and Strategy 2017, the North Carolina Symphony viewed mission 
focus and community engagement as drivers for its fiscal sustainability strategy. The 
orchestra’s mission also directly translated into two community-oriented program 
activities, music education and community concerts throughout the state of North 
Carolina, which served as economic drivers for the orchestra by expanding its current and 
future audience and donor bases. The symphony also utilized practices of transparency, 
leveraging people, and a service mindset, each of which deepened its community 
engagement and served as secondary fiscal sustainability strategies. 
Orchestras that seek to improve their fiscal sustainability are encouraged to create 
and execute a clear mission that fosters relational community engagement. Orchestra 
leaders should closely scrutinize their organization’s mission statement, making sure that 
it clearly and specifically articulates what the organization does, why it does what it does, 
and for whom. The mission should also identify what separates and distinguishes the 
organization from other large American orchestras. As orchestra leaders craft their 
resource engines, they should also focus on leveraging their people to advance their 
organizational mission as well as serve as economic drivers. To enhance their 
transparency and accountability to their constituents, orchestras are also encouraged to 
publish an annual Executive Summary or Report to the Community. Leaders of 
orchestras without a heavy emphasis on music education and community engagement are 
encouraged to reevaluate the role of those programs within their organization, and to 
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consider adopting a mindset of service toward their community. To further enhance their 
fiscal sustainability, orchestras can seek to increase government funding at the local and 
state levels as part a balanced revenue portfolio.  
One of Jim Collin’s defining features of a “great” nonprofit organization is one 
that “delivers superior performance and makes a distinctive impact over a long period of 
time.”
236
 In other words, a great nonprofit organization is an organization that manages to 
simultaneously fulfill its mission while generating the resources to do so over a long 
period of time. As previously discussed, American orchestras have historically struggled 
as a field to maintain solid financial grounding. In times of financial strain, it can be 
tempting for an orchestra to use its external circumstances as a scapegoat for the current 
internal condition of its organization, assuming that revenue is down due to a rough 
economic climate, and concert attendance is down because classical music is losing favor 
in American culture. However, as Collins points out, “we can find pockets of greatness in 
nearly every difficult environment. . . . Every institution has its unique set of irrational 
and difficult constraints, yet some make a leap while others facing the same set of 
environmental challenges do not. . . . Greatness is not a function of circumstance. 
Greatness, it turns out, is largely a matter of conscious choice, and discipline.”
237
  
Similarly, while American symphony orchestras face inherent challenges due to 
the income gap and cost disease, some orchestras manage to overcome their external 
environments and inherent limitations in order to achieve fiscal sustainability for their 
organization. Notably, the five fiscally consistent orchestras identified in Chapter III 
                                                          
236
 Collins, Good to Great and the Social Sectors, 5. 
237
 Ibid., 31. 
93 
 
came from a variety of regions, city sizes, and budget sizes. By studying and 
implementing the successful practices of peer organizations, other orchestras can also 
learn to combat the income gap and cost disease and thus improve their organization’s 
fiscal sustainability.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
SURVEYED ORCHESTRAS BY BUDGETARY EXPENSE 
 
 
Orchestras, Budgets Over $50 million 
1. Boston Symphony 
2. Chicago Symphony 
3. Philadelphia Orchestra 
4. New York Philharmonic 
5. Atlanta Symphony 
6. Los Angeles Philharmonic 
7. San Francisco Symphony 
8. Cleveland Orchestra 
Orchestras, Budgets $20 million to $50 million 
9. Baltimore Symphony 
10. St. Louis Symphony 
11. Houston Symphony 
12. Pittsburg Symphony 
13. Detroit Symphony 
14. Dallas Symphony 
15. Cincinnati Symphony 
16. San Diego Symphony 
17. Seattle Symphony 
Orchestras, Budgets $5 million to $20 million 
18. Colorado Symphony 
19. Oregon Symphony 
20. Buffalo Philharmonic 
21. North Carolina Symphony 
22. Alabama Symphony 
23. Jacksonville Symphony 
24. Charlotte Symphony 
25. Toledo Symphony 
 
 
 
 
 
1
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APPENDIX B 
REPORTED REVENUES AND EXPENSES FOR FIVE LARGE AMERICAN ORCHESTRAS, 2005–2011 
 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Los Angeles 
Philharmonic 
Total Revenue  $ 88,977,310   $ 91,494,734   $ 100,661,463   $ 103,246,603   $ 84,052,500   $ 113,775,295   $ 109,995,084  
Total Expense  $ 82,004,143   $ 79,111,158   $ 83,785,836   $ 89,029,795   $ 90,448,029   $ 96,932,388   $ 103,925,230  
Cincinnati 
Symphony 
Total Revenue  $ 36,204,574   $ 36,815,194   $ 38,721,237   $ 43,771,329   $ 35,783,680   $ 40,965,757   $ 42,557,698  
Total Expense  $ 34,757,372   $ 33,685,852   $ 37,011,352   $ 45,184,545   $ 39,008,488   $ 38,784,889   $ 38,064,211  
St. Louis 
Symphony 
Total Revenue  $ 42,881,194   $ 26,706,819   $ 26,814,285   $ 24,921,680   $ 31,990,272   $ 26,527,657   $ 27,006,947  
Total Expense  $ 18,705,063   $ 21,668,833   $ 23,056,633   $ 23,457,115   $ 25,290,204   $ 25,727,043   $ 26,306,728  
North Carolina 
Symphony 
Total Revenue  $ 10,124,701   $ 11,678,581   $ 12,033,672   $ 13,285,473   $ 11,355,552   $ 11,986,978   $ 11,832,424  
Total Expense  $ 9,703,429   $ 11,054,339   $ 11,575,290   $ 13,421,958   $ 13,426,018   $ 10,981,883   $ 11,472,722  
Buffalo 
Philharmonic 
Total Revenue  $ 9,893,204   $ 9,871,993   $ 11,110,338   $ 11,700,900   $ 10,862,595   $ 9,964,966   $ 9,981,170  
Total Expense  $ 9,704,365   $ 9,527,025   $ 9,878,847   $ 10,442,638   $ 10,566,992   $ 9,828,331   $ 9,944,361  
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APPENDIX C 
 
REPORTED REVENUE STREAMS OF FIVE LARGE AMERICAN ORCHESTRAS, 2005–2011 
 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Los Angeles 
Philharmonic 
Private Contributions  $ 25,774,336   $ 22,835,361   $ 28,069,354   $ 31,582,527   $ 22,840,847   $ 37,612,694   $ 32,376,918  
Government Support  $ 412,374   $ 1,466,964   $ 1,023,752   $ 1,279,729   $ 552,406   $ 873,793   $ 765,448  
Program Service Revenue  $ 60,151,937   $ 63,683,668   $ 64,898,669   $ 68,879,125   $ 67,705,595   $ 72,688,355   $ 73,712,103  
Investment Income  $ 1,177,854   $ 2,040,911   $ 2,578,951   $ 1,967,193   $ (6,602,137)  $ 2,885,848   $ 3,347,658  
Other  $ 1,460,809   $ 1,467,830   $ 4,090,737   $ (461,971)  $ (444,211)  $ (285,395)  $ (207,043) 
TOTAL REVENUE  $ 88,977,310   $ 91,494,734   $ 100,661,463   $ 103,246,603   $ 84,052,500   $ 113,775,295   $ 109,995,084  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Cincinnati 
Symphony 
Private Contributions  $ 10,922,278   $ 12,433,238   $ 11,723,170   $ 13,871,662   $ 12,961,183   $ 10,757,703   $ 14,185,804  
Government Support  $ 377,827   $ 534,336  $ 455,386  $ 3,693,498  $ 316,362  $ 195,494  $ 393,519  
Program Service Revenue  $ 21,041,455   $ 18,983,941   $ 22,717,136   $ 26,738,440   $ 24,461,943   $ 24,559,239   $ 24,235,842  
Investment Income  $ 891,245   $ 1,153,717   $ 1,134,857   $ (617,539)  $ (2,009,823)  $ 5,389,617   $ 3,703,292  
Other  $ 2,971,769   $ 3,709,962   $ 2,690,688   $ 85,268   $ 54,015   $ 63,704   $ 39,241  
TOTAL REVENUE  $ 36,204,574   $ 36,815,194   $ 38,721,237   $ 43,771,329   $ 35,783,680   $ 40,965,757   $ 42,557,698  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
St. Louis 
Symphony 
Private Contributions  $ 31,207,505   $ 14,585,200   $ 12,877,914   $ 10,911,779   $ 16,401,885   $ 11,143,410   $ 11,020,005  
Government Support  $ 1,479,073  $ 264,919  $ 1,589,579  $ 306,800  $ 1,332,120  $ 454,564  $ 1,283,349 
Program Service Revenue  $ 4,949,359   $ 5,734,001   $ 5,936,419   $ 6,122,786   $ 7,251,570   $ 8,314,542   $ 8,276,909  
Investment Income  $ 1,207,751   $ 572,776   $ 444,183   $ 342,914   $ 165,417   $ 64,582   $ 102,073  
Other  $ 4,037,506   $ 5,549,923   $ 5,966,190   $ 7,237,401   $ 6,839,280   $ 6,550,559   $ 6,324,611  
TOTAL REVENUE  $ 42,881,194   $ 26,706,819   $ 26,814,285   $ 24,921,680   $ 31,990,272   $ 26,527,657   $ 27,006,947  
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 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North 
Carolina 
Symphony 
Private Contributions  $ 3,334,344   $ 4,307,784   $ 4,494,726   $ 5,360,300   $ 3,556,329   $ 3,644,645   $ 3,951,022  
Government Support  $ 2,810,238   $ 2,970,791   $ 3,059,376   $ 3,130,963   $ 3,349,240   $ 4,436,946   $ 4,496,433  
Program Service Revenue  $ 3,494,442   $ 3,739,581   $ 3,723,649   $ 3,941,838   $ 3,777,797   $ 3,185,918   $ 3,260,295  
Investment Income  $ 323,739   $ 344,012   $ 533,754   $ 604,381   $ 11,927   $ 9,308   $ 3,631  
Other  $ 161,938   $ 316,413   $ 222,167   $ 247,991   $ 660,259   $ 710,161   $ 121,043  
TOTAL REVENUE  $ 10,124,701   $ 11,678,581   $ 12,033,672   $ 13,285,473   $ 11,355,552   $ 11,986,978   $ 11,832,424  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Buffalo 
Philharmonic 
Private Contributions  $ 5,617,358   $ 5,132,889   $ 6,290,271   $ 6,242,662   $ 5,952,358   $ 4,809,732   $ 5,098,680  
Government Support  $ 1,157,200  $ 1,221,200  $ 1,276,858  $ 1,248,098  $ 1,205,643  $ 1,452,500   $ 1,008,350 
Program Service Revenue  $ 3,109,200   $ 3,379,492   $ 3,283,875   $ 3,772,571   $ 3,381,997   $ 3,487,696   $ 3,515,257  
Investment Income  $ 1,016   $ 1,428   $ 26,453   $ 12,675   $ 231   $ 461   $ 937  
Other  $ 8,430   $ 136,984   $ 232,881   $ 424,894   $ 322,366   $ 214,577   $ 357,946  
TOTAL REVENUE  $ 9,893,204   $ 9,871,993   $ 11,110,338   $ 11,700,900   $ 10,862,595   $ 9,964,966   $ 9,981,170  
 
 
